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FOREWORD
Ukraine has been a pivotal actor in Eurasia since its independence
in 1991. Ukraine’s destiny is critical to the security of the entire postSoviet zone, and both it and the United States always have acted on
that assumption. The stated goal of Ukrainian defense policy long
has been to integrate with Euro-Atlantic structures like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and this goal has been one
of the chief objectives of the United States, as well. However, to
move from rhetoric to implementation is particularly difﬁcult where
the defense reform of a post-Soviet state has been concerned, and
Ukraine is no exception. Nevertheless, in the past few years Ukraine
has begun to make remarkable progress towards its self-professed
goal of defense integration with Western structures.
Mr. Leonid Polyakov’s detailed study of Ukrainian-U.S. defense
relations and of Ukraine’s defense reforms provides a comprehensive
account of these two intertwined processes with focus on the last
5 years. His analysis clearly points out both the obstacles and the
successes that Ukraine has encountered in its defense reform and
outlines the challenges ahead for both partners. Given that Ukraine is
a major contributor to the stabilization forces in Iraq and a key player
in any European and Eurasian security order, this monograph is of
more than academic interest. It has great policy relevance, especially
as the United States seeks to work with its allies and partners in other
post-Soviet states to foster their defense and political integration
with the West. This monograph deserves careful consideration, and
the Strategic Studies Institute offers it to foster better understanding
of Ukraine’s pivotal role.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

v

INTRODUCTION
From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine
has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the
beginning, there were signiﬁcant differences in political, security
and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which
formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these
obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations
between the two countries. But in the absence of their former
ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving
international peace and ﬁghting terrorism, Ukraine and the United
States have established constructive and mutually beneﬁcial military
cooperation.
The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet
Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it
wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to
have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a
partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States
consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in
building its national military by engaging it in peacetime militaryto-military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly
accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has
provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense
reform, raised Ukraine’s international prestige, and strengthened
the country’s position vis-à-vis the pressure for regional inﬂuence
exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia.
Bilateral programs of military contacts with the United States have
become the largest among Ukraine’s many international military
cooperation programs. Since 1992 bilateral military cooperation has
improved in terms of quality and substance, and set the stage for
preparation, execution, and support of actual U.S.-Ukraine combined
operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq. These combined
deployments have demonstrated that the years of cooperation were
not in vain; Ukrainians have proven their ability to be a reliable and
capable peacekeeping combat force.
However, as this monograph suggests, despite steady improvement in bilateral cooperation, developing full interoperability
between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries beyond joint peacekeeping
1

is not yet a realistic possibility. At a time when full combat
interoperability is beyond reach for even the closest U.S. allies, the
experience of previous U.S.-Ukraine partnership shows that the most
logical and realistic option is to promote and further improve tactical
interoperability for low intensity conﬂict: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. More ambitious goals are far
beyond Ukraine’s current ﬁnancial capabilities, and are restrained
by the country’s inability to qualify politically and economically for
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership soon.
This monograph consists of four parts. Part I presents a strategic
context for U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and provides general
data on the history and current state of security relations between
Ukraine and the United States. Part II focuses on the development
and improvement of cooperative mechanisms for bilateral military
contacts. Part III provides data and analysis of peacetime military
engagement and discusses important lessons learned. Part IV
examines Ukraine’s practical cooperation with the U.S. military
in operations in Kosovo and Iraq―operations where cooperation
continues today.
In sum, U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation has created a
reasonable foundation for limited joint and combined action, with
the United States helping Ukraine to build a noticeable cooperative
capability. This capability currently is being adjusted in Iraq and
other places. The potential remains for even greater cooperation, if
necessary improvements are made.
The United States should not be expected to carry the burden of
the future international peace and security agenda alone. In exercising
its leadership, the United States will have to rely on ad hoc coalitions
as often as it will rely on its closest allies. Ukrainian troops, though
not among the closest U.S. allies, are a likely partner of the U.S.
military in future contingencies. Thus the success of U.S. future
engagements could depend on how the two countries act today to
build their interoperability.
The history and lessons of U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation
may be of interest to scholars in post-Cold War East European
security affairs, and to operational planners and practitioners who
are creating and/or participating in a coalition force including the
United States, Ukraine, and/or other post-Soviet or post-totalitarian
states.
2

PART I
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
We are like long-distance cousins; where you grew up and you really did
not know your cousin, and now for some reason you have both moved to
the same city, and now you have the opportunity to see one another. And
now, as you get to know each other, certain things are very important
and demand attention right now, and then later on, there are still items
to work on, you just have to spend the time to get to know each other
better. And with time, eventually, you will fall in love with each other. So
maybe it is not long-distance cousins. Maybe it is long-distance lovers.
Joel Ostrom
Interview, November 12, 2003

In terms of territory, Ukraine is the largest European nation. It is
strategically located at a European crossroads between the eastern
borders of enlarged NATO and the European Union (EU) and the
western border of Russia, with Belarus to the north and the Black Sea
to the south. Ukraine’s border with Russia is 2,063 kilometers (km)
long; with Belarus, 975 km; with Poland, 542.5 km; with Slovakia,
98 km; with Hungary, 135 km; with Romania, 608 km; and with
Moldova, 1,194 km.
Ukraine’s population is approximately 48 million―down by 4
million from what it was in 1991, when it became independent after
the dissolution of the former Soviet Union.
Ukraine is famous for its fertile black soils and, consequently, for
its agricultural sector (“bread basket”); Ukraine produces millions of
tons of such commodities as grain, sugar, sunﬂower oil, and meat.
Ukraine is also blessed with a wealth of natural resources such as
iron ore, manganese, coal, nickel, and uranium. Except for oil and
gas, Ukraine is basically self-sufﬁcient. It is both agricultural and
industrial, producing a wide range of products including spacecraft,
tanks, radars, ships, transport aircraft, and many other state-of-theart products. Its workforce generally has earned a good reputation
in Europe for being industrious, educated, and skilled.
Ukraine also could become a notable sea power. Among the Black
Sea littoral nations, Ukraine holds ﬁrst place in terms of its coastline’s
3

length―1,720 km (Russia, 920 km; Turkey, 1,320 km; Georgia, 290
km; Bulgaria, 260 km; Romania, 240 km). The country has 18 seaports
and 8 shipyards, as well as its own system of educating maritime
specialists.1
Politically, Ukraine is a unitary state and presidentialparliamentary republic. According to its constitution, Ukraine is
a democratic, social, and law-based state. All the formal signs of a
democratic state exist: political parties, an elected Parliament, and an
elected president. But in reality, Ukraine is still struggling to become
a real democracy. Contemporary political life too often becomes a
battleground between dominant oligarchic and opposing leftist and
national-democratic forces, with major democratic values very often
declared rather than enforced.
Yet, as a forward step, Ukraine announced its intention to
integrate into NATO and the European Union in May 2002.
Historical Background.
Given its crossroads position between Europe and Asia, and
its natural wealth, it is no wonder that this land historically was a
battleground for legions of conquerors and for its natives, who lived
through centuries of glorious victories, humiliating defeats, heights
of national spirit, and darkness of subjugation and oppression.
On the territory currently occupied by Ukraine, the ﬁrst Eastern
Slavic State, Kievan Rus, emerged in the early 9th century, with
its capital in Kiev. The state’s ﬁrst rulers traced their roots to the
Varangians (Vikings), who came to Kiev from the north. The history
of this medieval state is largely a consecutive series of war stories
about ﬁghting invaders and internal rivals, conquering neighboring
tribes, and threatening Byzantium across the Black Sea. In the 10th
century Kievan Rus formally adopted Eastern Orthodox Christianity
as the state religion.
The state existed until the 13th century when it became a common
heritage for Ukrainians and Russians. In 1240 Kiev was destroyed by
the Mongols/Tartars, who dominated this land for about a century
until they were pushed away by the Grand Principality of Lithuania,
and later by the Rzech Pospolita (a Polish-Lithuanian medieval
state). The northern territories of Kyivan Rus around Moscow were
4

separated, and for almost another 200 years they were dominated by
Tartars, later becoming the Principality of Moscow, and later still―
”Great” Russia.
In the Ukrainian part of the Polish state, the introduction of
serfdom in the 16th century led to the emergence of a phenomenon
called Cossacks. These were former peasants who could not tolerate
serfdom and chose to escape to the southeastern steppes on the lower
River Dnipro (Dnepr), where they established a stronghold called
the Zaporozhian Sich.
With time, the Roman Catholic Polish state accepted the existence
of the Sich and often used its free peasant-soldiers in its wars. But
later, the Orthodox Zaporozhian Sich gained strength as a political
power and pursued an independent policy of shifting alliances with
powers other than Poland. This became intolerable for the latter
and provoked attempts at suppression. The subsequent Cossacks’
rebellion in the middle of the 17th century under the leadership
of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was victorious, but the Cossacks failed
to secure an independent state, choosing instead in 1654 to join
Moscow’s Orthodox Tsar, on the condition that they preserve a
confederate status and internal self-rule.
Moscow later reneged on this arrangement and imposed its power
on Kiev, liquidating Ukraine’s autonomy and proclaiming itself
the ruler of Ukraine. In 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed.
“Muscovites” became “great Russians,” or simply “Russians,” and
Ukrainians became “little Russians” and lived under Russian and
later Soviet rule.
While relations between ordinary people of the two nations
throughout 3 centuries have been generally tolerant, Russia’s
imperial rulers were always on alert for the stirrings of Ukrainian
nationalism and tolerated no hints of Ukraine’s escaping their
political control. The Ukrainian language was once banned in the
19th century, and signs of national independence were always
persecuted severely. In the 20th century’s Soviet period, this took the
form of the destruction of Ukraine’s attempts to become independent
during the civil war of 1917-20; the imposition of an artiﬁcial famine
in 1932-33 after Ukrainians showed that they were unwilling to
submit to collectivization (some seven million Ukrainians perished
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from hunger); and the severe persecution of Ukrainian nationalist
resistance after World War II.2
In 1991, after the infamous coup in Moscow, Ukraine’s Parliament
(Verkhovna Rada) adopted an Act of Ukraine’s independence on
August 24, and a national referendum on independence in December
showed that 91 percent of the population supported independence.
Thus the modern state of Ukraine appeared on the world map,
although the prospects for its independent development were not
rosy.
Ukraine inherited from its Soviet past the aftermath of the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear disaster; a large, but “heavy” energy-inefﬁcient
industrial base, with some 80 percent of it dependent on Russianmade components and energy supplies; an almost total lack of
national-level management; and a weak civil society. Ukraine also
inherited Soviet bureaucratic traditions and an uneasy relationship
with Russia, which, despite the ofﬁcial proclamations of friendship
and strategic partnership, at times could be characterized as uneasy
cooperation―a “cold peace.”
Ukraine as a Military Power.
In terms of military power, newly independent Ukraine
inherited a great deal from the Soviet Union.3 Forces located on
Ukrainian territory were part of the second strategic echelon of the
Soviet western theatre of operation. In pure numbers, the country
inherited the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal; about 40 percent
of the former Soviet Union’s armed forces personnel and equipment;
and huge stocks of Soviet strategic reserves of arms, supplies, and
ammunition.
As for ground forces, in 1991 Ukraine hosted on its terrain 5 armies,
1 army corps, 18 divisions (12 motorized riﬂe, 4 tank, and 2 airborne),
3 airborne brigades, and 3 artillery divisions. The Air Force had four
air armies, while Air Defense had one air defense army and three
corps. Also, a Black Sea Fleet, not initially under Ukraine’s control,
was divided between Ukraine and Russia in 1997. There was one
rocket army of nuclear-capable Strategic Missile Forces and many
support units. Soviet military educational facilities on Ukrainian
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territory consisted of 34 military colleges and 78 military faculties at
civilian universities to provide military education and training.
In terms of numbers, there were 6,500 battle tanks; more than 7,000
armored combat vehicles; 1,500 combat aircraft; 270 attack helicopters;
350 combat ships and support vessels; and millions of small arms
pieces and millions of tons of ammunition. Ukraine inherited a large
nuclear arsenal, with 220 strategic weapon carriers, including 176
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (130 SS-19 and
46 SS-24 missiles) and 44 strategic bombers (19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95).
The overall nuclear potential of the strategic force was estimated at
1,944 strategic nuclear warheads, in addition to 2,500 tactical nuclear
weapons. The ICBMs were targeted at the United States and armed
with multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, and
every bomber carried long-range cruise missiles. In the military were
some 800,000 troops in total.4 Ukraine also possessed one-third of the
Soviet defense industry―1,840 enterprises and research centers that
employed 2.7 million people. Some facilities had unique capabilities
such as shipbuilding and missile production.
However, it was not a coherent national defense sector per se,
but a fragmented collection of what used to be the mammoth Soviet
military-industrial complex, which had to be transformed into the
national defense sector of Ukraine. Despite Ukraine’s becoming
the world’s third largest armed power immediately after gaining
independence (taking into account all inherited conventional and
nuclear capabilities), it did not have much time to enjoy this status.
The extremely high “inheritance tax” on this Cold War legacy became
obvious very soon. In fact, the legacy brought more debts to be paid
than wealth for prosperity.
It was obvious from the beginning that Ukraine needed a smaller
force for its defense and one that it could afford. But in the absence of
sound experience and appropriate intellectual capacity to produce
a meaningful reform plan, Ukraine initially tried to recreate a
Soviet-model system. These efforts, however, took place against a
background of rapid economic decline. Due to poor governance and
the virtual absence of effective economic reforms, the promising
economic potential of Ukraine rapidly disappeared: from 1991-95,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped by almost 50 percent. It
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bottomed out in 1999 with an estimated 60 percent reduction, if
compared with the last preindependence year of 1990. Thus in the
1990s defense reform basically was conﬁned to cutbacks of the most
obsolete and expensive parts of the Armed Forces (for numbers, see
Table 1).

Battle tanks
Armored combat vehicles
Combat Ships
Combat aircraft
Attack Helicopters
Total military personnel
(Army personnel), thousand

1991

1996

1991-2002
Total
2002 Reduction

6,500
7,000
9
1,648
271
800
(300)

4,080
5,050
12
1,090
230
400
(190)

2,467
4,103
17
392
133
290
(170)

3,033
2,897
+8
1,236
138
510
(130)

2006
Plan
1,800
3,500
18
225
120
160
(106)

Table 1. Dynamics of Reduction of Weapons,
Military Equipment, and Personnel in Ukraine.
By the turn of the millennium, however, the situation qualitatively
changed. All nuclear weapons were removed or dismantled.
Economic decline was also reversed in 2000, and since then Ukraine’s
economy has grown by some 5-8 percent per year. Necessary defense
reform experience also was acquired and applied to reach more
reasonable decisions. Though the military equipment remaining
in service has become 13 years older (with poor maintenance and
scarce modernization), more attention and resources are coming
to some priority areas, providing hope for the positive outcome of
reform efforts. Constant attempts to reform the military generally
have resulted in certain structural changes and in the threefold
reduction of the numerical strength of the military―from almost
800,000 military servicemen in 1991 to 250,000 in 2003. However, the
country is unable to sustain even this number, and further reductions
by almost half are imminent. On the positive side, a certain degree of
experience has accumulated, and there have been modest successes
in some rather low-tech/low-cost areas (international peacekeeping;
combat engineering; chemical, biological, and radiological [CBR]
protection; military education; and transport aviation).
8

In addition, recent encouraging decisions point Ukraine’s military
towards the creation of a Joint Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)5 and to
the transition to all-volunteer manning instead of the current mixed
conscript/contract model. Defense budgeting has shown modest
signs of improvement, which has made it possible to channel resources
to funding some priority requirements, such as, for instance, military
intelligence and RRF unit training.
To a signiﬁcant extent, Ukraine’s limited achievements in
the defense sector are due to the country’s active participation in
international peacekeeping and military-to-military cooperation,
both under the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and
under programs of bilateral military cooperation. After the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Ukraine became
a member of the antiterrorist coalition.
Beginning with 400 peacekeepers sent to the former Yugoslavia
in 1992, in 2004 Ukraine had well over 3,000 peacekeepers around the
world participating in 11 missions in such places as Iraq, Lebanon,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Georgia, and others. Having gained a
reputation as a reliable peacekeeping force, the military of Ukraine
is in constant demand from the United Nations (UN) and other
security organizations, thus signiﬁcantly contributing to Ukraine’s
international image. Ukrainian transport aviation is working hard
under contracts from the UN and from individual NATO countries
(including the United States) to sustain operations in Africa,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places.
With regard to cooperation with NATO, Ukraine became the
ﬁrst of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries
to join the NATO PfP Program in February 1994. In 1995, UkraineNATO cooperation started in a real peacekeeping operation, with
the deployment to Bosnia of the Implementation Force (IFOR). It
continues―beginning with the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR),
and later with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), in which Ukraine has almost
250 personnel, mainly within a joint Ukrainian-Polish mechanized
battalion.
On July 9, 1997, in Madrid, Spain, Ukraine and NATO signed the
“Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and Ukraine.” This event paved the way for the
creation of a Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and a Joint
9

Group on Civil Emergency Planning. Soon after signing the charter,
NATO opened its Information and Documentation Center in Kiev
(its ﬁrst on the territory of the former Soviet Union), and established
a NATO liaison ofﬁce in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, which has
been headed by a retired U.S. military ofﬁcer since January 2004.
In 2000 Ukraine ratiﬁed the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
and in 2002, the Exchange of Classiﬁed Information Agreement, and
offered its large Yavoriv Training Center in Western Ukraine for the
purposes of PfP training and exercises. Ukraine’s NATO partners
render important assistance in personnel training and developing
interoperability. Ukrainian representatives are regularly invited
to attend NATO training courses abroad and participate in joint
exercises. Many hundreds of Ukrainians already have graduated
from colleges and courses abroad.
Since 1995 Ukraine has participated in the NATO interoperabilitybuilding vehicle commonly known as the Planning and Review
Process (PARP). It started by accomplishing only one interoperability
objective out of 14 the country voluntarily took upon itself to achieve
in the ﬁrst cycle of PARP (1995-97), and somewhat improved during
the second cycle―11 accomplished out of 27 selected. Currently
Ukraine is in its third PARP cycle program, and is trying to integrate
PARP, previously limited to the interoperability of PfP-designated
units only, into the overall process of reforming Ukraine’s military.
To this end, Ukraine has coordinated with NATO, through the Joint
Working Group on Defense Reform, to develop a list of 51 PARP
partnership goals, prioritizing language training, command and
control, and logistics. The most illustrative practical examples of
these efforts are the creation of a multinational staff ofﬁcers course,6
increased emphasis on English language proﬁciency for certain
categories of ofﬁcers’ positions, and creation of the ﬁrst all-volunteer
units within RRF.
Overall, Ukraine’s partnership with NATO has developed into
an extensive, mutually beneﬁcial, and promising cooperation. Taken
together with such major factors as the historical military tradition
of Ukrainians, the growing contribution of the Ukrainian military
to international peacekeeping, and recent positive developments
in Ukraine’s defense reform, it creates a favorable background for
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building U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and the particular
issue of improving interoperability.
Political-Military Framework.
It probably would not be an exaggeration to say that, before
independence, Ukraine, for a majority of educated Americans,
basically was known―if at all―only as the one-time “bread basket”
of Europe and as a part of the former Soviet Union (Russia). This
knowledge reﬂected only Ukraine’s agricultural potential―a
historical image created by largely Russophile-dominated American
East European studies.
For a few, Ukrainians also were known for their original culture
and many centuries of continuous but largely unsuccessful struggle
for self-government and independence. In the course of this struggle,
Ukrainians sometimes were very ruthless to their perceived
oppressors―be it Poles, Russians, Germans, Jews, or Turks―and these
stories helped to inﬂate a false, stereotyped image of Ukrainians as
“stubborn and ungrateful” or “greedy and selﬁsh” nationalists. In
addition, as part of the Soviet Union/Russia, Ukraine was known
as a territory harboring a large part of the Soviet nuclear potential,
which was targeted at the United States, and as such, represented a
vital threat to U.S. security (which was correct).
Given that Ukrainians themselves had a rather limited ability to
present their historical arguments, their inﬂuence on U.S. foreign
policy prior to becoming independent was also limited, being
realized only through émigré circles. The above-mentioned dominant
perceptions of Ukrainians as “unpredictable and dangerous
nationalists” were very likely behind the logic of the famous speech
in August 1991 by U.S. President George Bush to the Supreme Soviet
(Parliament) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic just weeks
before the infamous Moscow coup and Ukraine’s declaration of
independence, in which he warned Ukrainians that ”. . . freedom
is not the same as independence . . . [Americans] will not aid those
who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”7 Such
warning naturally surprised Ukrainians and ignited protests and
demonstrations from the Ukrainian Diaspora in the United States.
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Thus the beginning of the political relationship between the two
countries was rather rocky.8 Despite Ukraine’s earlier adoption of
the Declaration of State Sovereignty in July 1990, which declared
that “Ukraine would not acquire or produce nuclear weapons,” it
took some time for U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine to change its
main focus from pressuring Ukraine to denuclearize.
The difference in political, security, and even bureaucratic
cultures was also a noticeable obstacle to building bridges fast
enough,9 but several major developments contributed to a positive
change in the relationship, which generally took shape by 1995.
First, Ukrainian authorities appeared to be cooperative on the issue
of nuclear disarmament. They did not always seem eager to satisfy
their U.S. partners, since they did not consider it appropriate for
Ukraine to bear the entire burden of dismantling and disposing of
nuclear arms. After all, it was not Kiev’s decision to deploy these
arms on Ukrainian territory. However, the successful conclusion of
the denuclearization agreement with the United States and Russia
(the so-called Trilateral Accord) and ratiﬁcation of the Strategic
Arms Reduction (START) I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol in early
1994, soon followed by Ukraine’s accession to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, effectively made the country a non-nuclear state and defused
all nuclear-related concerns.
Second, Ukraine appeared to be open to security cooperation
with the West, speciﬁcally with NATO and the United States. In
fact, the exchange of visits, invitation of military students, and other
cooperative events between Ukrainian and U.S. militaries started
immediately after Ukraine became independent and well before the
signing on July 27, 1993, of the ﬁrst background document for military
cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the
Department of Defense (DoD) of the United States―”Memorandum
of Understanding on Defense and Military Contacts.”
Third, despite all the political and economic turmoil of the ﬁrst
years of independence, Ukraine managed to avoid the internal
discord and even bloodshed common to many other CIS states such
as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia. Ukraine also set the
ﬁrst and very important real example for the rest of the CIS countries
by managing the peaceful transition of presidential power in July
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1994 from Leonid Kravchuk to Leonid Kuchma.
The new, much more positive spirit of cooperation was reﬂected
in high-level U.S. policy documents. If one looks into the U.S. National
Security Strategy for 1995 (subtitled “A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement,” February 1995), one cannot help but
notice how often the state of Ukraine is mentioned in this 27-page
document―over 20 times. The Strategy also introduced a policy
of distinguishing Ukraine, in parallel to Russia, from other newly
independent states when talking in general terms about the countries
of the former Soviet Union.
Thus an initial period of suspicion and cautious rapprochement
lasted for the ﬁrst half of the 1990s but paved the way to a following
period of much broader political and security engagement and
cooperation, which continued through the second half of the
decade. During that period the United States and Ukraine achieved
signiﬁcant progress in the political and security dimensions of their
bilateral relationship. The main institutional structure overseeing
this progress was the U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission created
in September 1996 and led by President Kuchma and Vice President
Gore. In the corresponding declaration on the establishment of this
Commission, the term “strategic partnership” was used for the ﬁrst
time.
In fact, throughout the 1990s the United States became the major
global lobbyist for Ukraine.10 In 1996-97 Ukraine even became the
third largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world (after Israel and
Egypt), and the number one recipient in the former Soviet Union. But
this did not continue for long due to the U.S. Congress’ disappointment
in Ukraine’s failure to resolve speciﬁc disputes involving U.S. ﬁrms,
and the country’s general inability to provide favorable conditions
for U.S. business development and investment.
By the year 2000, what had become the ritual practice of
mentioning of Ukraine in parallel to Russia in ofﬁcial speeches
and communiqué had faded away. There appeared to be a sense
of growing disappointment by Washington in Ukraine’s overall
progress. In the U.S. view of that time, Ukraine:
. . . has not moved from independence and nuclear disarmament to
economic and political reform . . . has not escaped the predation and
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corruption of the transfer of power and property from state to private
hands . . . its leaders have spoken conﬁdently of a European future for
Ukraine, but they have done little to prevent Ukraine from slipping into
a near Third World country, which for the old, weak and marginal is a
decline from the Soviet past.11

The unfolding Ukrainian political crisis was precipitated by the
murder of opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze in the fall
of 2000. Seeing no progress in the resolution of the case and a
deepening political crisis for more than a year, by 2002, America’s
new administration began to show signs of frustration with and
loss of interest in Ukraine. The U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission
ceased to function, and the previous cordiality of political relations
was clearly evaporating.
Other problems followed. The United States had misgivings
over Ukrainian supplies of heavy armaments in 2001 to the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the internal ethnic strife
there. (The weapons sales were legal and above-board, but the
United States viewed them as potentially destabilizing). But the real
“bombshell” was the announced authentication by U.S. authorities
in 2002 of a recording in which President Kuchma allegedly
approved the proposed transfer of the Ukrainian “Kolchuga” air
defense system to Iraq. This created a full-ﬂedged political scandal.
The U.S. Government responded by delaying the appropriation
of Freedom Support Act funds, while NATO allies downgraded
Ukraine’s participation in the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting
at the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague from the head of
state to ministerial level. In the latest National Security Strategy of the
United States (September 2002) prepared by the Bush administration,
Ukraine is not mentioned at all, in noticeable contrast to the National
Security Strategies of the Clinton era. Ukrainian authorities, for their
part, denied all weapons sales accusations and, in turn, showed
displeasure towards Western philanthropic organizations allegedly
funding the Ukrainian political opposition.
Fortunately for the two countries’ partnership, converging
interests prevailed over these differences. By the start of 2003, political
decisions on both sides were made that these setbacks should not
prevent a mutually beneﬁcial U.S.-Ukrainian relationship.12 Ukraine
agreed to deploy its CBR-protection unit to Kuwait in March14

April 2003 during the campaign in Iraq, and later contributed a
peacekeeping brigade to the stabilization efforts of the coalition
force there. This was not easy for Ukraine for a number of reasons,
mainly due to negative public attitudes towards the war in Iraq and
the strong opposition of Russia.
The U.S. leadership responded by agreeing to stop ignoring
Ukraine’s leadership and to meet brieﬂy with Ukrainian President
Kuchma, whose international image suffered seriously as a result of
Gongadze- and “Kolchuga”- related scandals, and with Ukrainian
Prime Minister Yanukovych during visits to the United States in 2003.
U.S. ofﬁcials also expressed cautious support for Ukraine’s hopes of
becoming a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) participant in
the near future. However, they made clear that the success of future
bilateral relations would be judged by the progress of Ukraine’s
democratic development.13
Thus, in the middle of the third 5-year period of their relationship,
in the political dimension the United States and Ukraine appeared to
be adopting the policy of small practical steps towards each other,
rather than attempting to revive the inﬂated expectations of “strategic
partnership.” In light of their recent experience, both sides are very
careful to keep the door of cooperation open in spite of possible
disagreements.
Security Cooperation.
While political relations between the two countries have had a
great many high and low points, sometimes resembling a foreign
policy “roller coaster,” their security cooperation somehow managed
to remain rather stable and has been progressively improving. This
cooperation has developed along three main axes: dismantling
Ukraine’s Soviet nuclear legacy, improving the national security of
Ukraine, and cooperation in ﬁghting terrorism and peacekeeping.
As far as cooperation on dismantling of the Soviet nuclear legacy is
concerned, it started immediately after Ukraine became independent.
Even the issue of Ukraine’s diplomatic recognition was conditioned
by U.S. concerns about nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, which
were addressed during the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State
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James Baker and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on December
18, 1991, prior to President Bush’s announcement on December 25,
1991, of the formal U.S. diplomatic recognition of an independent
Ukraine.
It took 3 years (1992-94) of relentless negotiations for the United
States and Ukraine to bring the latter ﬁrmly to non-nuclear status
and frame the generally successful nuclear disarmament process. In
June 1996 the last nuclear warhead left Ukrainian soil, in October
2001 the last Ukrainian ICBM silo was destroyed, and the same year
the last of the Ukrainian Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear strategic
bombers were destroyed, along with hundreds of air launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) or converted to nonmilitary use. In August 2002
the 43rd Rocket Army of the former Soviet Strategic Missile Forces
was ﬁnally disbanded. Thirty-eight nuclear capable Tu-22M Backﬁre
bombers were also destroyed, while the remaining 19 Tu-22Ms were
scheduled to be eliminated by September 2004. The most visible
remaining issue is the U.S. possible support for the destruction of
rocket engines, which is anticipated to be concluded in 2007.
Overall, by the start of 2004 the United States will have spent
almost $700 million to eliminate strategic nuclear delivery systems
in Ukraine within the framework of the well-known Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (also known as the “Nunn-Lugar”
program after its U.S. congressional sponsors). According to former
Ambassador of the United States to Ukraine Carlos Pascual, “It is
almost easier to predict where this country will be in 25 years than
in 3 years.” That, he added, is precisely why the United States must
keep supporting Ukraine’s efforts to eliminate its weapons of mass
destruction. “It is the best security money we have ever spent.”14
U.S. support for Ukraine in improving its national security is
another dimension of cooperation that is 13 years old and continues to
develop progressively. Its major component is defense cooperation,
but also includes export control and nonproliferation and other areas
such as border control, emergency management, and civil-military
cooperation.
In the second half of the 1990s, bilateral programs of military
cooperation grew to more than 120 events every year, which made
the U.S.-Ukraine programs of that time almost twice as large
as Ukraine’s second largest bilateral program (with the United
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Kingdom) and almost three times larger than Russia’s program of
military cooperation with Ukraine.
A large proportion of the bilateral cooperative events were
funded within the scope of the CTR Program as well―through
targeted CTR monies promoting “Defense and Military Contacts
Programs” focused on promoting defense reform and developing
trust and interoperability. However, after September 11, 2001, the
number of yearly events funded this way within Ukraine’s armed
forces has been cut approximately in half. This reduction reportedly
occurred “due to postponements caused by the new priorities under
the Global War on Terrorism and deliberate efforts by the U.S. and
Ukraine sides to focus on quality rather than quantity.”15
But this reduction did not occur in other funding sources and
programs, some of which even increased and thus partly compensated
for the reduction in the major traditional source. For instance, in 2002,
each U.S. regional Combatant Command (U.S. European Command
[EUCOM], for example) has a source of U.S. DoD funding known as
“Traditional CINC (commander-in-chief) Activity”16 (TCA) funds,
often utilized for cooperative activity with partner military forces.
TCA, for example, funded two exchange visits between the U.S.
Army Europe’s (USAEUR) Southern European Task Force Brigade
and the Ukrainian 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade, the main
ground forces component of Ukraine’s rapid reaction force. These
exchanges established the groundwork for a partnership between
the brigades to be further developed through the 2003 PfP exercise
“Peace Shield.”17
The U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Program has provided over U.S.$16 million since its establishment
in Ukraine in 1992 to educate about 500 Ukrainian ofﬁcers and
noncommissioned ofﬁcers (NCOs) and over 100 civilians in U.S.
military establishments (See Table 2). IMET training supported efforts
to improve interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. and
NATO militaries, and to promote transformation and restructuring
within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by providing opportunities
for select Ukrainian ofﬁcials to attend U.S. military and educational
institutions. In addition, the expanded IMET (E-IMET) Program
provided training for Ukrainian military and civilian ofﬁcials,
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including personnel from nondefense ministries and the legislative
branch, on defense budget management, creating an effective military
justice system and moving to civilian control of the military.

Fiscal
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total (by end of 2004)

Training Number of
Expenses Students
$Thousand Total
0,075
0,413
0,600
0,707
1,020
1,015
1,250
1,250
1,338
1,443
1,675
1,692
1,700
1,800
15,978

3
13
8
40
33
37
46
48
43
49
53
48
77
TBD
498

In that,
Civilians
0
0
1
23
9
9
16
4
2
5
10
13
19
TBD
111

Table 2. The U.S. IMET Program for Ukraine: General
Indicators.18
In the Ukrainian case, the IMET Program has achieved qualiﬁed
success. It might be judged as less successful if compared with
participants from Ukraine’s neighbors in Central Europe, but
it is certainly more successful if compared with Russia. Several
Ukrainian graduates of the IMET program have achieved prominent
ofﬁcial positions such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostiantyn
Hryshchenko (Naval Post Graduate School), former Head of the
Analytical Service of the National Security and Defense Council
of Ukraine Anatoliy Grytsenko (Air War College), and a few
ambassadors, deputy ministers, and parliamentarians. Others have

18

attained the rank of general ofﬁcer such as Sergiy Mokrenets (Army
War College), Oleg Taran (National War College), Leonid Holopatiuk
(Naval Post Graduate School), and several more.
Ukraine’s interoperability with U.S./NATO in peacekeeping
and humanitarian operations, (for instance, Ukrainian involvement
in KFOR) has been supported through programs such as the U.S.
Department of State―Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program and
U.S. Department of State―Peacekeeping Operations. In particular,
this support is made available to Ukrainian participation in the
Ukrainian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) peacekeeping support
operations within the U.S. sector of Kosovo. This funding is not only
helping to solve NATO manpower needs, but provides Ukrainian
troops experience in interoperability with Western forces and
exposure to NATO professional standards and practices.
Every year some $1-3 million is allocated by the U.S. Departments
of State and Defense to Ukraine’s participation in PfP Program
through the so-called “Warsaw Initiative,” founded by the United
States in July 1994. Among other important purposes, the initiative
helps to promote the ability of the Ukraine’s armed forces to cooperate
with NATO allies and NATO partners, as well as to prepare for
joining NATO.
In terms of security cooperation, the United States also has
provided signiﬁcant technical support in nonproliferation efforts
and strengthening Ukraine’s export control system. It supported
the strengthening of Ukraine’s borders against illegal migration
and cross-border crime, as well as in many other projects. Recently,
the United States approved a $30 million multiyear comprehensive
CTR weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Proliferation Prevention
Initiative of equipment, training, and technical assistance for the
State Border Guard Service and the State Customs Service. Rather
than individual parts, the Border Guard Service was asked to
develop a complete concept including land, maritime, and riverine
control. Once the concept is developed, the equipment needed will
be provided as an integrated solution beginning in 2004.
Through the California-Ukraine partnership, training is underway
at the California Highway Patrol and Border Guard Academy at
the city of Khmelnytskyi. Other exchanges and expert visits are
planned for 2004 to address contraband cargo inspection measures
19

and rapid response unit operating models. An interagency team of
California law enforcement agencies support these and other needs,
including criminal intelligence sharing tools from the Western States
Information Network, ofﬁcer safety from the California Department
of Justice, and harbor security from the San Francisco Police
Department.
This tremendous amount of U.S. security support to Ukraine paid
off on a number of occasions. This included Ukraine’s agreement
in 1998 to terminate its participation in the Russian-Iranian contract
on the construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr, Iran; Ukraine’s
contribution to the antiterrorist coalition through granting overﬂight
rights and sharing intelligence information; and, of course, the
contribution of peacekeepers to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.
These examples demonstrate that the 13 years of Ukraine’s
bilateral military cooperation with the United States and other NATO
countries were not in vain; they created at least a minimal foundation
for combined action. The Ukraine-U.S. and Ukraine-NATO
programs proved their value, which could have been greater, if not
for certain political and administrative problems on the Ukrainian
side. Prominent East European security affairs expert British scholar
James Sherr, speaking about Iraq, noted, “Like the United States,
Ukraine has shown nerve. Very few others have shown it. If it can
keep its nerve and defend its interests on other fronts, it will not only
earn the support of the ‘new Europe’, it will earn its right to be part
of it.”19
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PART II
THE COOPERATION MECHANISM
To categorize it as “good or bad” overall, however, I would have to
say “good,” but I am disturbed at aspects of the “negative side” of
the equation. There exists still a tendency in the Ukrainian Defense
bureaucracy to over-centralize planning and decisionmaking. In any
system this inevitably leads to various inefﬁciencies and frustrations.
Harry Simmeth
Interview, December 11, 2003

From the beginning, the initiative in bilateral military contacts
was clearly on the U.S. side. Several obvious factors prompted this
situation, such as the much heavier political and military “weight”
of the United States vis-à-vis Ukraine, more substantial U.S.
experience in building cooperative relations with other countries,
a U.S. commitment to ﬁnance the bulk of expenditures related to
cooperative events, and so on.
Most importantly, the U.S. side had a conscious interest in
engaging Ukraine and a rather clear understanding of what it wanted
to achieve from this cooperation. It also had systemic strategic
guidance documents that framed “engagement” with emerging
states as a key policy and that provided the “glue” to create and hold
together an appropriate cooperation mechanism. The U.S. National
Military Strategy, in particular, ﬂeshed out the basis for military-tomilitary engagement programs in support of the national strategy.
On its part, Ukraine simply accepted U.S. leadership in planning
and coordination of the bilateral military cooperation, although
without any correspondingly well-coordinated strategy documents
or guidance. It seemed to be enough that Ukraine was now an
independent democratic state and no longer had any ideological
differences with the United States. Moreover, a comfortable
relationship with the U.S. military represented at least a symbolic
counterweight to Russian inﬂuence or bullying. On a practical
level, military cooperation with the United States would provide an
opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, which for
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many also meant the very attractive opportunity to travel abroad,
including to the United States.
In fact, the Ukrainians were cooperative from the very beginning
and still are. But due to the continuous instability inside the Ukrainian
military, precipitated by lack of clear political guidance as well as
by permanent reorganizations and reductions, the military was
very slow in building effective military cooperation structures and
procedures. These structures and procedures still require signiﬁcant
improvement.
Strategic Guidance.
When the issue of U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation ﬁrst
appeared on the agenda in 1992, the U.S. side already had a hierarchy
of strategic guidance documents and certain institutional instruments
to translate the guidance into mutually-negotiated plans for real
cooperative events such as the IMET and FMF programs, as well as
military-to-military contact visits and even combined exercises. At
that time, the global strategic equation had just changed from bipolar
confrontation to an uncertain and ambiguous global environment.
In the wake of the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the immediate U.S. security interests in Eastern
Europe were very clear: reduce the threat of nuclear war, constrain
the proliferation of WMD, preclude any reemergence of the “evil
empire,” and support regional stability. The subsequent shift from
previous strategies of containment of communism and nuclear
deterrence naturally required a new policy of ﬂexible engagement.
Thus the existing U.S. institutional and intellectual capability to
formulate and articulate U.S. national interests helped to start the
cooperation with Ukraine and other so-called newly independent
states of the former Communist bloc. It also augmented the
mechanism of foreign military relations with several high proﬁle
overarching security programs such as CTR and PfP, as well as
additional targeted military-to-military cooperation programs,
including the U.S. European Command Joint Contact Team Program
(JCTP)20 launched in 1992 (formally it got to Ukraine in 1998) and
Army National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)21 which
started in 1993.
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However, when Ukraine became independent, it had no
mechanisms for strategic planning and planning to protect national
interests by military means. Ukraine had no National Security
Council, no Ministry of Defense, and no General Staff of the
Armed Forces. Capabilities of the previously existing Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine were rather limited, given its small staff,
republican subordination within the former Soviet Union, and the
routine practice of the outﬂow of the best specialists to Moscow.
The ﬁrst Ukrainian strategic level documents were soon drafted
and approved by the Parliament, but their value was very limited
because of their largely declarative nature. This was further
exacerbated by the complexities of the nation-building processes
in the 1990s, which took the form of long internal political battles
for redistribution of powers between Ukrainian legislature and the
executive branch.
Ukrainian national security strategy level documents like “The
Foundations of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy” (1993) and “Concept of the
National Security of Ukraine” (1997) were rather good as the ﬁrst
national exercise in drafting strategic level conceptual documents.
However, the correct, albeit “very general in tone,” provisions
reﬂected “the continuing ambiguities present in deﬁning Ukraine’s
security interests, threats, and policy objectives.”22 More to the point,
the virtual absence of an enforceable implementation system to force
executive structures to follow these documents, plus continuous
internal political rivalry in the country, precipitated the big gap
between the documents’ theses and real practices in security area.23
At least these documents deﬁned the strategic basics to include
the non-nuclear, nonaligned status of the country and its general
interest in European integration and building cooperative relations
with the United States. But they certainly were too unspeciﬁc to
provide clear strategic guidance for Ukrainian planners on policy
priorities and allocation of resources.
As far as the U.S. National Military Strategy is concerned, in
terms of its continuity from the U.S. National Security Strategy, the
ﬁrst post-Cold War document of 1995 displayed a clear example
of how to translate the National Security Strategy requirement of
“engagement and enlargement” into speciﬁc subordinate military
strategy guidance:
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Military-to-military contact programs are . . . effective instruments . . .
to forge new and more cooperative relationships both with former
adversaries and with formerly non-aligned nations. . . . success . . . hinges
on mutual trust, effective communications . . . interoperability, and
doctrinal familiarity . . . The militaries of Central and Eastern Europe are
a particular priority.24

In comparison, the main Ukrainian military security level
documents of the 1990s―”Military Doctrine of Ukraine” (1993) and
“State Program for the Building and Development of the Ukrainian
Armed Forces for the Year 2005” (1996)―provided less clear guidance,
especially on the goals of military cooperation with any other
countries. They generally reﬂected the euphoria and inexperience of
the ﬁrst years of independence.
Instead of providing speciﬁc direction, the 1993 military doctrine
only contained general tasks and a long list of good intentions, with
priorities unsupported by resources. It stated very ambiguously that
Ukraine “builds its relations with other countries regardless of their
social-political system and military-political orientation on the basis
of recognition of all issues of national security of two sides.”
The State Program (1996) was developed by the military itself,
approved by the president, and was classiﬁed “secret.” Its main
tenets, which were made public, did not go very far. They included
adoption of speciﬁc legislative acts, preparation for all-around
unilateral defense of the country, and set general goals of force
modernization and numerical reductions to the level of Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limitations.
However, the turn of the decade brought new tendencies on both
sides. In the United States, the new Republican Bush administration
came to ofﬁce. It suggested a new strategic vision, which, while
generally continuing the “engagement and enlargement” approach,
appeared to be shifting from inclusive multilateralism to “coalitions
of the willing.” Of course, the entire focus of U.S. strategy was
affected tremendously by the events of September 11, 2001, and by
the U.S. response. While reemphasizing common values, the National
Security Strategy (2002) also puts special attention on accountability
of the receivers of foreign aid: “Nations that seek international aid
must govern themselves wisely, so the aid is well spent. For freedom
to strive, accountability must be expected and required.”25
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In Ukraine, the experience of reforming the military, based in
no small part on the useful examples of other countries including
the United States plus changes in the global and regional security
environment, brought about new national strategic guidance as
well as a new national military strategy. The new “State Program
for Reform and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine,” adopted
in 2000, made signiﬁcant steps in deﬁning the priorities of defense
reform to include creation of a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, gradual
abolition of conscription and a turn to manning on a contract basis,
and improving the Reserve structure.
Furthermore, in May 2002 the National Security and Defense
Council of Ukraine took a strategic decision to join NATO in the
future and in July 2002 the Ukrainian President approved the
Strategy of Integration to NATO. After this decision was made,
Ukraine developed and agreed on an Individual Action Plan with
NATO. Ukraine also tried (thus far, unsuccessfully) to be admitted
to NATO MAP participation.
Given the negative inﬂuence of the remaining problems of the
country’s democratic and economic development on the progress
of defense transformation, these latest positive developments in
Ukraine’s strategic security guidance should not be overestimated.
However, they are leading in the right direction and provide more
clear guidance for military cooperation.
Planning for Military Cooperation.
In 1992 the United States began military cooperation by forming
contacts with high-level Ukrainian military ofﬁcials. Invitations to
Ukrainian ofﬁcers to study at U.S. military colleges under the longexisting IMET program followed. In 1992 the ﬁrst two Ukrainian
colonels went to the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Issues of future military cooperation
were discussed when then-Ukrainian Minister of Defense General
Kostiantyn Morozov visited Washington, DC, in April 1992, at the
invitation of then-Defense Secretary Richard Cheney.
On both sides, speciﬁc structures overseeing new military
cooperation issues were created. The United States assigned this task
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to the newly created “Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia (RUE)” Division
in the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff. This newly formed staff
division consisted of ﬁve ofﬁcers―about half the size of the typical J5 division. The Ukrainians created the Foreign Relations Directorate
(FRD) within their General Staff of the Armed Forces, where the
mission of coordinating cooperation with the United States (and
Canada) was assigned to a corresponding group of ﬁve people.
The bulk of the ﬁrst contacts in the early years of military
cooperation was related to the issue of Ukrainian nuclear arsenal
dismantlement and primarily coordinated through Ukraine’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the ﬁrst high-level political
and military contacts also secured the ﬁrst bilateral military
cooperation agreements, which enabled the planning and conduct of
the ﬁrst speciﬁc military-to-military cooperative events between the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. DoD. A Memorandum
of Understanding (1993) provided for semiannual meetings of a
“Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Contacts” and
annual talks between the U.S. Joint Staff and Ukraine’s General
Staff.
During the period of 1993-95, the initial yearly plans of military
contacts were worked primarily through countries’ defense attaché
ofﬁces, and the number of bilateral cooperative events slowly grew
from some 20 in 1993 to around 50 in 1995. In fact, despite the high
interest on both sides in large expansion of military cooperation, the
agenda of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament naturally overshadowed
the agenda of bilateral military-to-military contacts. This issue
remained until the United States and Ukraine worked out all the
major problems of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons by the end of 1994.
Then, in spring 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited
Ukraine and suggested moving past issues of nuclear disarmament
to questions of social protection, security, and military and economic
cooperation.
Colonel Harry Simmeth,26 the U.S. ofﬁcer who became responsible
for the execution of this policy guidance, found the task rather difﬁcult,
given that he reported to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS). Under U.S. law the CJCS does not command military assets;
primarily he is the chief military advisor to the President and the
Secretary of Defense. Normally, one of the regional U.S. Combatant
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Commands would assume the job of military cooperation with a
country in its area of operations. In Ukraine’s case, this role is held
by the USEUCOM. However, during the Cold War, the entire Soviet
Union (including Ukraine) was never assigned to a U.S. Combatant
Command, a situation that continued until 1998. This meant that
CJCS had at his immediate disposal few resources with which to
execute military contact programs, and could not simply order the
regional Combatant Commands to assist. (Another effect was that,
while a Combatant Command would normally have a sizeable staff
section coordinating military cooperation, CJCS basically only had
Colonel Simmeth. It also meant that some of the most mundane and
routine matters, rather than being handled by “experts” at lower
levels, immediately rose to the attention of the highest levels.
Essentially, CJCS―meaning, in this case, Colonel Simmeth―had to
“ask” the Combatant Commands and other U.S. agencies to support
proposed programs and events with the necessary resources. This
vastly complicated his ability to construct and execute a plan. He was
largely reduced to proposing events to these agencies and soliciting
their ideas. His one advantage was the availability of the additional
funding sources noted earlier, which at least heightened the “spirit of
cooperation” shown by the commands and agencies solicited. What
almost necessarily emerged initially from this process was largely
a “buffet” of proposed activities, rather than a set of coordinated
activities within a coherent plan. Colonel Simmeth observed:
There were no formal lower-level planning mechanisms beyond the
BWG (bilateral working groups) and Joint Staff Talks through which
to develop coherent programs. But, since there were those mechanisms
at the strategic level (BWG and Joint Staff Talks), the higher leadership
had agreed in general to conduct activities. In turn, there was pressure
to elaborate this into actual cooperative events. This created pressure
for results. Planners were expected to devise various events whether
there was a coherent plan or not. Worse (from a planning perspective)
the pressure for such tangible “deliverables” was not tied to any rational
planning schedule, but primarily to the date of the next high-level
meeting.27

However, despite the fact that the Ukrainian side participated
enthusiastically in developing this ﬁrst formal agreement on military
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cooperation (negotiated by Colonel Simmeth and a Ukrainian
counterpart in 1995 for implementation in 1996), it was by far
primarily the U.S. side that suggested the majority of cooperative
events contained in the document. Although it was referred to as
the “U.S.-Ukraine Plan for Military Cooperation for 1996,” it was (as
noted) more properly a list of events based on the guidance available
in U.S. national security documents, concepts, and ideas generated by
J-5 RUE’s counterpart staff section in the U.S. Ofﬁce of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), CJCS’ intent, and the “volunteered” services of
U.S. various commands and agencies.
This said, it nevertheless must be noted that the “plan” was far
from being totally disjointed, because of relatively clear guidance
provided by U.S. strategic level documentation. This guidance
speciﬁed the goals of “encouraging military reform,” “civilian
control of the military,” “fostering greater regional cooperation,”
and “facilitating Ukraine’s participation in PfP.” It was assumed in
this documentation that military contact events could support these
goals by focusing on their substance while developing “mutual trust,
effective communications, interoperability, and familiarity with each
other’s doctrines.” Another goal, “imparting democratic values,”
in the process would happen primarily by familiarizing Ukraine’s
military with the democratic processes in which the U.S. military is
required to work, and by personal interaction among commanders,
staffs, and troops during cooperative activity.
Additionally, there was some further rationalization of the Plan
during Joint Staff-General Staff negotiations. For example, the effort
was made to link certain events (as when a visit to the United States
by an Ukrainian IL-76 Candid transport plane for training with the
U.S. Air Force brought along a Ukrainian Army Regimental staff
for an exercise with the U.S. Army). An attempt also was made to
identify activities that suggested follow-on events for the next year’s
list, in the hope of creating logical progression (for instance, the
exercise “Peace Shield” 96 would be a U.S.-Ukraine sponsored event
geared to help prepare Ukraine to host a larger and more complicated
NATO exercise in following years).
When the plan was developed, the Ukrainian side agreed with
all of the U.S. proposals; this surprised the United States, which
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doubted Ukraine would be able to handle such an ambitious
schedule of activity (this turned out to be true, with about 15 percent
of the events being cancelled or postponed). But the larger surprise―
and eventually, disappointment―was the realization by the United
States that the Ukrainian side was not particularly strong in deﬁning
its own goals for bilateral cooperation with the United States, even
when asked and “coached.”
Given the Ukrainian lack of clarity regarding priorities, the
United States mounted a much more serious effort over the next
several years to help them focus on meeting both U.S. and Ukrainian
objectives and producing a “programmatic” approach, resulting
in a more integrated and coherent cooperation plan. This led to
the creation of a working-level direct contact arrangement among
military planning experts called the “Colonel’s Conference.” This
conference was co-chaired by representatives of the U.S. Joint Staff
and the Ukrainian General Staff, and comprised delegates from
each side’s military services, commands, and appropriate agencies,
to include a prominent role for USEUCOM. This model helped to
produce contact plans that were much better focused, and, despite
the general expansion of the plans, to reduce pressure for “numerical
success.” The list of events was now backed by the ﬁrst coherent
sub-programs, such as plans for the continued long-term conduct
of the “Peace Shield” series of peacekeeping exercises, the “Sea
Breeze” naval exercise series, and a highly comprehensive project
to help create a Ukrainian NCO corps. California and Kansas were
designated as PfP state partners for Ukraine; their state National
Guard organizations cooperated in creating a series of coordinated
events focused on civil-military affairs, disaster relief, and search and
rescue, as well as peacekeeping and contingency operations. In 1998,
an important change took place in the U.S. command and planning
arrangements―Ukraine ﬁnally became assigned to USEUCOM
(along with Ukraine’s neighbors, Belarus and Moldova, plus the
Caucasus region). This had a signiﬁcant impact in that both sides had
to adapt to new cooperative mechanisms. The Colonels’ Conference
was replaced by the Military Liaison Team (MLT)―an arrangement
successfully tested by USEUCOM in Central Europe.28 The idea was
for a team of U.S. ofﬁcers to work in Kiev with Ukrainian ofﬁcers, as
well as with the USEUCOM Staff,
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to create plans, identify resources available to fulﬁll activities, and to
submit timely requests to other agencies. Regularly established channels
would be available for efﬁcient funds administration. From the U.S.
perspective, this would be a much more efﬁcient, continuous, and
coherent way to operate.29

In general, however, because of the U.S. friendly but somewhat
dominating attitude to Ukraine in the 1990s, plus Ukraine’s lack
of clear focus on what it wanted from U.S.-Ukrainian military-tomilitary cooperation, the initial plans developed under the MLT
concept concentrated on familiarization events to the detriment of
events tied to speciﬁc goals and objectives. To some extent, the MLT
program seems to have arrived with the notion that the parties were
“starting anew” despite the record of cooperation already logged.
On a larger scale, however, the NCO development project continued
to be successful, and there was a further rationalization of exercise
goals and schedules.
To be completely fair to the U.S. MLT concept, the cooperative
attitudes of the Ukrainians were dealt a blow by the reorganizing of
FRD into the Department of International Cooperation of Ukraine’s
Ministry of Defense (DICMOD). DICMOD replaced the FRD as the
agency interfacing with the MLT. The U.S. concept had been to align
the MLT with the Ministry of Defense/General Staff for direct liaison,
the model used in East Central Europe. Ukraine instead imposed
the DICMOD, which initially seemed more concerned with building
its own “empire.” This included stressing its own “importance” by
demanding that all contact, even routine correspondence, be routed
through its own very inefﬁcient bureaucracy. Inevitable delays and
frustrations developed, as did the quality of planning overall. In
an environment of generous U.S. funding, coupled with Ukraine’s
inability to prioritize and (eventually) DICMOD’s bumbling, bilateral
military cooperation frequently witnessed inﬂated expectations on
the Ukrainian side and produced frustration for the United States.
Even strong U.S. supporters of the military cooperation program were
often at least irritated by what often appeared to be the Ukrainians’
overestimation of costs and efforts to “squeeze” one project to fund
additional activity. (For example, to accommodate a U.S. ship visit, a
request was made that the United States provide funds to refurbish
the pier at which the ship was to dock). Former Army attaché in Kiev
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Colonel Timothy Shea has skeptically concluded about that period
of cooperation that:
The amount of money thrown at peacetime military engagement
has convinced senior Ukrainian leadership that the United States
has unlimited resources and that the decreasing incentives represent
Washington’s indifference. What is needed is less lecturing, greater
humility, more thoughtful organizing, rewarding positive change, and
discouraging inappropriate action.30

A legacy of Soviet-style behavior to this day remains among many
Ukrainian top military leaders and some remaining Soviet KGBstyle security regulations, as well as a legacy of Soviet centralizing
bureaucracy. This has furthered U.S. frustration. As Colonel Shea
observed,
Designed to be collocated with counterparts on the general staff, MLT in
Ukraine’s case was forced to accept residency on the opposite side of Kiev
from Ministry of Defense. Instead of directly coordinating with planners,
the team relies on DICMOD apparatchiks to administer the program . . .
The legacy of the Soviet armed forces and KGB remains deeply imbedded
in the psyche of most senior ofﬁcers.31

To make the situation worse, the unfolding severe economic crisis
in Ukraine in the 1990s made it impossible to achieve any Ukrainian
defense reform objective beyond reduction of structures, personnel,
and equipment. The humiliating social conditions of Ukrainian
ofﬁcers provoked a noticeable outﬂow of qualiﬁed personnel
from the military in general, and in particular from structures
coordinating military contacts, where personnel had comparatively
high marketing value due to the knowledge of foreign languages
and possession of valuable experiences. There was also a problem
of so-called “military tourism”―distorted criteria for selection of
participants in cooperative events would frequently occur, such
as when an appropriate “expert” would be passed over in favor of
someone in a position to “bump” him. This was especially true in
case of trips from Ukraine to other countries, which at that time also
meant at least per diem pay―an important addition to a Ukrainian
ofﬁcer’s monthly pay of lower than U.S.$100, even for colonels.
However, the turn of the decade brought better strategic guidance
on the Ukrainian side and a slightly different, more pragmatic
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strategic focus on the U.S. side, which, along with experience gained,
helped to improve the planning and management of cooperative
events on both the U.S. and Ukrainian sides.
To cure the problem of exaggerated cost estimates, for example,
the United States, since FY 2000, moved from direct reimbursement of
goods and services provided by the Ukrainian side during combined
exercise, to hiring contractors and providing contracts based on
competitive bidding.
To provide for better coordination on its side, the United States
brought together the previously separate MLT (responsible for JCTP
and SPP) and the Security Assistance Ofﬁce (responsible for IMET
and FMF), and in 2001 created in Ukraine a joint structure―the
Ofﬁce of Defense Cooperation (ODC), which also incorporated the
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Ofﬁce.
To provide for a better quality rather than a greater quantity of
cooperative events, the number of planned events was reduced twice
from over 120 at the end of the 1990s to some 60-70 “high quality”
events per year starting in 2001. Plans themselves were drafted with
more discretion and have been more closely tied to defense reform
priorities under a new Ukrainian State Program (2000).32 New issues
of cooperation of a rather technical nature appeared on the rise since
Ukrainian participation in the Kosovo (from July 1999) and in the
Iraq (from August 2003) campaigns, for which the United States
provided partial ﬁnancial compensation and technical assistance.
To facilitate the Ukrainian military’s force development and
acquisition prioritization planning, in 2001 during Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Kiev, the United States suggested
conducting a defense analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
by a team of USEUCOM experts. The focus was Ukraine’s RRF.
The analysis, accomplished by October 2002, provided valuable
background both for Ukraine’s defense reform planning and for
planning of bilateral military contacts. According to the Head of
Bilateral Affairs Ofﬁce (the new name for MLT after being moved
under ODC) Major Joel Ostrom,
For 2004, our planned focus is on the Rapid Reaction Force that was
agreed to by the U.S. and Ukrainian leadership at the last joint staff talks.
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The reason for that is to ensure that the effort, the ﬁnancial resources, are
going to be used to further professionalism of the Ukrainian military,
which will last beyond its restructuring and the downsizing of the
Ukrainian military.33

On the Ukrainian side, qualitatively positive actions could be
found in development of the system of military contacts coordinating
structures and somewhat better personnel management. In addition
to the central bilateral cooperation body of Ukraine’s MOD (now
the DICMOD), each service now has its own division of military
cooperation. In the General Staff a separate Directorate of EuroAtlantic integration was created with the speciﬁc mission to
coordinate Ukraine’s military NATO- and EU-related activities, as
well as to participate in peacekeeping missions. A top ofﬁcial at the
level of Deputy Defense Minister was designated to address foreign
military cooperation issues.
The detrimental Ukrainian tendency to attempt to obtain as
much money from the United States as possible has been tempered.
It is true that the United States is more attuned to the issues and
provides better oversight. But the Ukrainian military seems to have
somewhat changed its attitude as to the “unlimited” nature of U.S.
resources. During the conference in Warsaw in May 2003 to discuss
contributions to the Iraqi Stabilization Force, Ukrainian generals
announced the intent to contribute a brigade, but afterwards they
were less eloquent (in notable contrast to some other contributing
nations) in asking for either assistance or reimbursement of the
brigade’s deployment costs.
Unfortunately, other damaging factors on Ukrainian side remain,
such as the tendency towards over-centralized decisionmaking,
inefﬁcient and irritating bureaucracy, and over-restrictive security
regulations. But at least these problems have been identiﬁed, and
discussion of them gains momentum; and with it, the chances for
correction grow.
However, in this case, it should be pointed out that success will
be difﬁcult to achieve, if efforts to repair the culture of bureaucracy
and secretiveness is limited to the Ukrainian military establishment
only. To a signiﬁcant extent, success of the military’s democratizing
remains hostage to success in wider democratic governance reform
in the country.
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In general though, despite all the remaining problems, the
planning mechanism is improved, and now the two sides’
cooperation encompasses not only peacetime military engagement,
but preparation, execution, and support of actual combined
deployments and operations. It is unlikely that the U.S.-Ukraine
combined operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq would have
been possible without the stage having been set by years of peacetime
military engagement, whatever its imperfections.
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PART III
PRACTICAL PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT
There are a few aspects of interoperability that we must address when we
discuss the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Technical issues can be
addressed by making a commitment to procure interoperable systems.
But physically obtaining western equipment does not solve the problem.
Training and accepting doctrine are as, if not more, important. There
needs to be a focus on western standards. This is where there seems to be
the biggest gap.
John Cappello
Interview, December 30, 2003

Ideally, in order to be successful, practical military cooperation
should be well-planned, well-supported, and well-executed in
accordance with sound strategic guidance. According to U.S. Joint
Vision 2020 (JV2020):
Although we must retain the capability to act unilaterally, we prefer
to act in concert with our friends and allies. Laying a solid foundation
for interoperability with our alliance and potential coalition partners is
fundamental to effective combined operations. We remain committed
to doctrinal and technological development with our key allies
and to combined training events and exercises that contribute to
interoperability.

Apparently the guiding principles of JV2020 for jointness
ultimately will guide the interoperability agenda as well:
A fully joint force requires joint operational concepts, doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures―as well as institutional, organizational,
intellectual, and system interoperability―so that all U.S. forces and
systems operate coherently at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels.
Joint effectiveness does not mean that individual pieces of equipment or
systems are identical, but rather that commanders are not constrained
by technical or doctrinal barriers among the components of the joint
force, and that the joint force’s capability is dramatically enhanced by the
blending of complementary Service capabilities.
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As far as any Ukrainian documents’ provisions on interoperability
are concerned, this issue is related almost exclusively to the UkraineNATO agenda. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (2002)
states among the “Principles of Defense and Security Sector Reform”
that:
Cooperation in defense-related areas promotes interoperability with
NATO and increases Ukraine’s overall ability to be a key player in regional
security. Reform efforts and military cooperation also support Ukraine’s
strategic goal of Euro-Atlantic integration by gradually adopting NATO
standards and practices, and enhancing interoperability between the
armed forces of Ukraine and NATO forces, in particular through the
implementation of Partnership Goals and participation in NATO-led
crisis response operations.

To this end, several objectives are formulated, such as:
Develop the full interoperability, sustainability and mission effectiveness
of the Armed Forces through effective implementation of Partnership
Goals; maintain the readiness of Rapid Reaction Force units for
participation in joint operations with NATO, and training of these units
to meet NATO standards; achieve a required level of compatibility for
the actual and future armaments and military equipment and doctrine of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which allows minimum interoperability in
order to conduct, on a case-by-case basis, tasks of common interest with
NATO, and adapt/adjust acquisition and related practices to those of
NATO Allies; and develop interoperability between Ukraine and NATO
communication and information systems.

Provided that the two sides have enough trust in each
other to contemplate ﬁghting side by side, success in achieving
interoperability between their militaries in an actual mission will be
enhanced through practical peacetime cooperation. The actual level
of interoperability thus becomes a derived category of the level of
achieved common standards in language, training, doctrine, and
technical systems during their practical peacetime engagement.34
Language.
From the very beginning, there was a clear understanding
on both sides that truly interoperable allies should use the same
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working language and the same terminology; in other words, that
use of English is critical to enhance interoperability. (Although both
English and French are the ofﬁcial operating languages of NATO,
English predominates by far. As it is unlikely that NATO will adopt
Ukrainian as an ofﬁcial language any time soon, the importance of
English, therefore, is obvious).
When the ﬁrst Ukrainian IMET students went to the United States
in 1992, it was already clear that an in-country system of preliminary
English language training was needed by Ukraine. The intention
was to train Ukrainian instructors at the U.S. Defense Language
Institute and supply language laboratories to Ukraine, where trained
instructors could bring Ukrainian IMET candidates and other related
personnel to required proﬁciency levels before they went abroad for
further study.
In 1993 the ﬁrst two instructors went to the Defense Language
Institute (Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas). Ten years
later, there were 32 U.S.-trained English language instructors, and
several dozens trained in Canada and the UK. A number of foreign
instructors―5 from the United States and 14 from the UK―came
to the country through this period to teach English for Ukraine’s
military.35
During the ﬁrst years of cooperation, the focus was on training
candidates for the IMET program. But Ukraine’s participation
in peacekeeping operations soon broadened this focus. By 1995
two U.S.-supplied language laboratories were operational in the
Odessa Army Institute and the Kiev Military Institute of National
Shevchenko University, while the Kiev Army Institute offered 20
hours of language training for ofﬁcers selected for peacekeeping
operations. In 1997 one more U.S.-supplied laboratory was opened
in the Sevastopol Naval Institute to support the exclusive needs of
Ukraine’s Navy. Since 1994 Canada and the UK have invited some
30-40 Ukrainian ofﬁcers and MOD civilian employees every year to
their language training centers as well.
In addition to IMET and other foreign programs, in the new
context of Ukraine’s commitments to an interoperability agenda
under NATO’s PARP, the Ukrainian military decided gradually to
increase efforts to produce a sufﬁcient number of qualiﬁed Englishspeaking personnel.
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While more in-country language laboratories were needed
and the United States planned to provide these, there was also an
understanding that military colleges (in Ukraine they are termed
military institutes) could and should provide better background
training for cadets, which was to be further upgraded at language
laboratories and specialized language courses when required. In
1998, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense ordered the number of language
training hours for cadets increased by 100 hours, and compulsory
examination at the end of the last year was introduced.
By 2001, seven U.S.-supplied language laboratories were
operational in Ukraine’s military, along with several courses offered
by the UK (the latter trained both active and retired personnel).
However, even this number was enough only for training IMET
candidates, while increased Ukrainian commitments to peacekeeping
operations still suffered from a lack of language proﬁcient personnel.36
According to former Deputy Army Commander Lieutenant General
Victor Hudym:
[In 2001] English language as a common language for Army ofﬁcers so far
failed to become the focus of ofﬁcers’ education and training. Today we
feel great demand for English speaking ofﬁcers, especially for missions
abroad and participation in PfP events. Unfortunately, in regular units
the conditions for and organization of studying English cannot permit
quality and timely accomplishment of joint missions and resolution of
common problems.37

Indeed, as many Ukrainian and foreign experts observed, for
Ukrainian staff ofﬁcers it appeared much easier either to enroll in
the IMET program or to attend language courses usually located in
large urban areas, where the major Ukrainian military headquarters
are located as well. But for units’ commanding and logistical staff at
bases in more remote areas, especially in the case of those having a
large number of subordinate personnel requiring constant attention,
it was nearly impossible to ﬁnd the opportunity for language
training.
Further, by the middle of 2002, after Ukraine declared its
intention to become a NATO member, attention to English language
interoperability assumed greater criticality. New actions followed.
A system of language curriculums at educational institutions was
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supplemented by study courses streamlined into an “evening”
(without interruption of service assignment), “day,” and “foreign”
system of courses.
Also in 2002, by the order of the Minister of Defense, a list of
speciﬁc positions requiring knowledge of foreign languages was
approved. This list contains over 2,500 positions. Provisions to make
it easier for these selected personnel to attend courses also were
developed and established. New incentives for those successfully
mastering language were instituted to retain qualiﬁed personnel,
since once an ofﬁcer learned to speak English, his skill becomes
highly marketable. However, “real life” conditions of unit ofﬁcer
assignment obligations often continued to be a stronger priority than
declared requirements and incentives for language training.
The latest move came at the end of 2003, when the Minister of
Defense approved the “Program for the strengthening of the language
training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel for 2004-2005.”
Under the program, the network of foreign-language courses is to
provide places for 205 students in 2004. It will function based at 10
military higher education institutions of the Ministry of Defense and
several selected training centers.
By the end of 2005, the network capacity is to be expanded
and new foreign-language courses are to be created, including at
locations where Ukrainian peacekeeping contingents are deployed.
The overall network of language training is planned to have places
for up to 320 students, thanks to these measures. Eight additional
language laboratories, provided by the United States under the FMF
Program will be established in military education institutions. There
are also plans to introduce new ways of teaching classes without
removing personnel from service. As a new development, not only
ofﬁcers will undergo language training, but other personnel also will
participate, including selected soldiers, sergeants, and civilians.
In general, as of 2004, the highest and rather acceptable level
of English language proﬁciency is being displayed by Ukrainian
staff ofﬁcers, many of whom accumulated experience through
IMET education, local and foreign language courses, multinational
exercises, and peacekeeping missions. Commanding and logistical
staff ofﬁcers coming from units generally have uneven levels of
English due to time constraints not favorable to combining education
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with performing assigned unit-level duties. The poorest state of
language proﬁciency is on the soldier-NCO level, where training is
not organized properly as yet.
After 13 years of cooperation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces
have made noteworthy progress in English language proﬁciency.
Primarily, this is due to the continuous efforts on both sides, and a
signiﬁcant amount of U.S. ﬁnancial and technical support. However,
because of the lack of serious planning attention during the ﬁrst
years of cooperation and a lack of focus until very recently, language
interoperability still requires signiﬁcant improvement.
Training.
Since 1995, when the ﬁrst joint tactical peacekeeping exercise,
“Peace Shield,” was conducted at Ukraine’s Yavoriv Training
Center, Ukrainian and U.S. Army units have been regularly involved
in various kinds of training exercises. As a rule, these exercises are
conducted “In the spirit of PfP,” when Ukrainians and Americans
play the key role in planning, ﬁnancing, and conducting exercises,
while inviting many other NATO partner nations to participate.38
Not only U.S. and Ukrainian Army units have trained together,
but also naval forces and marines/naval infantry (“Sea Breeze,
“Eloquent Nugget”). Ukrainian and U.S. Air Force units additionally
have conducted some low-level but productive combined training,
especially in cross-familiarization with each other’s transport aircraft
and procedures. In addition, there is a number of now-traditional
series of multinational exercises under the NATO PfP program,
where Ukrainians cooperate with U.S. and other NATO militaries,
contributing to U.S.-Ukrainian interoperability on different subjects to
include maritime logistic support systems (“Cooperative Support”),
communication system interoperability (“Combined Endeavor”),
interoperability in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief tactics
(“Cooperative Osprey” and “Cooperative Nugget”), and many
others.
In relation to training exercises, it is important to note the unique
role of the “Peace Shield” series, which became traditional. The
overall number of participants ranges from 800 to 1,200, representing
the armed forces of 20-26 countries. The cost of the exercise so far
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has been covered largely by the United States and constitutes some
U.S.$400,000-700,000 per exercise.
With time, the scenario and equipment underwent changes
and improvements. In 2000, the establishment of a satellite system
of teleconference communication made it possible to keep certain
participating units’ headquarters outside the borders of Ukraine
and locate them in Estonia and Bulgaria, from which locations they
participated on a “virtual” level. In 2001, a transatlantic ﬂight by
three U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft after three refuelings in midair
ended with a joint Ukrainian-U.S. parachute drop on the Yavoriv
Training Center by 180 paratroopers of the U.S. 82nd Airborne
Division, 120 paratroopers of the 1st Ukrainian Airmobile Division,
and 9 pieces of Ukrainian combat airborne ﬁghting vehicles. The
same year the exercise scenario changed from a traditionally abstract
one to a concrete situation modeled on Kosovo and set in the zone
of responsibility of the Multinational Brigade “East” under U.S.
command, in which Ukraine participates.39 The latter was truly an
example of the progression to utilizing exercises to anticipate and
solve practical issues of interoperability.
“Peace Shield” also was raised from the battalion to the brigade
level and transformed from a live-training tactical-level event to
both a live-training and virtual-training tactical/operational level
event. This involved the introduction of computer-assisted stafflevel exercise simulations with corresponding involvement of a
small number of troops from the participating armed forces in live
tactical play. Despite some continuing organizational deﬁciencies,
these exercises provided valuable lessons learned for both the U.S.
and Ukrainian sides. As noted in 1998 by U.S. Major General (Ret.)
Nicholas Krawciw in after-action comments:
For the future, it would be beneﬁcial for NATO and Ukraine to conduct
a series of computer assisted staff exercises designed to involve, over
time, as many Ukrainian military headquarters as possible in various
peacekeeping staff functions. Exercises “Peace Shield 97” and “98”
provide a U.S.-Ukrainian model for useful future computer assisted
training.40

The experience received during “Peace Shield” and NATO PfP
exercises along with practical lessons from peacekeeping missions
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has allowed Ukrainians to produce several rudimentary tactical
manuals for training their personnel to perform future peacekeeping
together with other countries.
It also allowed, with support from the United States and NATO,
the conduct of large-scale exercises like “Cooperative Adventure
Exchange” in October 2002, when some 3,000 military personnel
from 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) and from six partner nations
(Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia, and Ukraine)
struggled to improve the interoperability of Allied Command
Europe Mobile Forces, LAND with other headquarters and units
from NATO and partner nations. At the same time these exercises
promoted common understanding of deployment, organization,
employment, and redeployment of a multinational formation in a
ﬁctitious UN-mandated NATO-led peace support operation.
The Ukrainians gained many good lessons from these combined
exercises: peacekeeping techniques, standard operating procedures
(SOP), the role and use of simulations, communication equipment,
and leadership. At the same time, these exercises generally have
shown that, while intellectually and physically Ukrainian servicemen
were not much inferior to American, the Ukrainian combat training
system, doctrine, and ethos of leadership needed signiﬁcant
improvement.
In fact, Ukrainian [post-Soviet] manuals provide a solid base of
methods, procedures, and techniques for attaining necessary combat
skills through rigorous training. This is one of the major reasons
why the former Soviet military was considered to be very good in
“generating raw combat power.” As proven many times by the U.S.
Army’s Opposing Force (OPFOR) Regiment at the U.S. National
Training Center (Fort Irwin, California), these techniques and skills,
if mastered and applied properly, appear not at all to be inferior to
those adopted in U.S. ﬁeld manuals, and permit the OPFOR to ﬁght
and typically win tactical engagements with other U.S. Army units
in training.
However, most people would agree that the average Ukrainian
unit noticeably would be less combat capable than a U.S. one, even
if given the same equipment. There is an obvious problem on the
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Ukrainian side, which is a lack of necessary resources for training.
In addition, conscript manning and less consistent leadership
qualities could be counted as negative factors. But to a signiﬁcant
extent, the average Ukrainian unit would be weaker mainly because
of the inferior training system currently in place. In essence, there
is a big gap between what is written in manuals and what kind of
real practice Ukraine inherited along with good combat manuals.
On paper, units should master skills in accordance with the speciﬁcs
of their assigned mission, geographical speciﬁcs of the territory
where the mission is to be performed, and with different approaches
to day/night conditions. In fact, this is hampered by a number of
negative factors: signiﬁcant amount of time consumed by repeating
cycles of basic training for rotating conscripts; a very weak NCO
corps and, consequently, Ukrainian ofﬁcers being too busy with
other than training business; little opportunity to train more than
at company level―very basic but important things. And to top it all,
Ukrainian units have no such things as developed Mission Essential
Task Lists (METLs) to guide their training; in the U.S. military, each
unit’s METL helps to prioritize and assist in organizing training on
the most essential tasks for that unit, which in turn helps to tailor
and rationalize the current U.S. system of combat training.
In Ukraine, there is still a Soviet-style conscript-oriented system
of “periods of training”―two half-year periods per year, based on the
curriculum provided by “Program of Army combat training” and
similar programs for other services. The system is driven in large
part by the need to bring new conscripts “up to speed” every halfyear. Thus, in reality, Ukrainian soldiers routinely master the same
basic skills every period to pass the “control inspection” at the end,
but very rarely is there an opportunity to be trained as a coherent
unit in anything resembling advanced tactical operations. Ukrainian
ofﬁcers, faced with this simplistic non-innovative approach to
combat training―especially when added to the very low quality of
life provided by the current system of social support (pay, housing,
retirement beneﬁts, etc.)―often lose the incentive to try to train their
units to any higher standards.
On a low level of joint peacekeeping, these differences are not a
big problem yet, though it is a growing issue in terms of efﬁciency

43

of the way Ukrainians man and train their higher-than-company
peacekeeping contingents. This will be true especially in view
of Ukrainian plans to have a fully professional RRF soon, as well
a standing peacekeeping brigade of up to 3,000 strong and the
deployment of a relatively large Ukrainian force in Iraq.
The necessity of improving the system of Ukrainian combat
training was recognized by a U.S. team of experts, conducting the
“Defense Analysis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” in 2002. In
the ﬁnal report of this analysis, which was primarily focused on
Ukraine’s RRF, the team explicitly recommended to begin with
developing METL and a new set of standards, and suggested using
the U.S. Army set of manuals/evaluations “that may be useful as a
model for a similar system for the Ukraine Armed Forces.”41
As far as multinational headquarters staff training is concerned,
the progress already is past the stage of familiarization. Growing
participation of Ukrainian ofﬁcers in peacekeeping deployments
abroad has prompted the opening in 2000 of special courses for the
ofﬁcers of multinational staffs within the National Defense Academy
of Ukraine. These courses train ofﬁcers who are selected for the
positions in international peacekeeping or similar multinational staffs.
For each rotation, up to 40 ofﬁcers study the theoretical foundations
of peacekeeping for 2 weeks, as well as practical Ukrainian and
international experience in working on a multinational basis. The
curriculum is based on programs from NATO schools.
In 2003, the courses provided training for a group of Ukrainian
ofﬁcers who were to be appointed to various positions in Iraq, where 11
Ukrainian ofﬁcers served in Joint Coalition Headquarters in Baghdad
and 24 Ukrainian ofﬁcers and one senior NCO in the multinational
“Center-South” division headquarters in Babylon. Instruction was
carried out exclusively in English, and the curriculum itself was
adopted with consideration of actual operational experience in Iraq.
Instructors from the United States, Canada, and France helped to
teach the course, along with Ukrainian instructors.42 There is a plan,
with the support of NATO, to transform the courses for the ofﬁcers
of multinational staffs into a (international) center for training the
ofﬁcers for peacekeeping operations.
The United States supplied the courses with the bulk of supporting
computers, local network equipment, software, and literature, as
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well as providing some visiting lecturers to supplement permanent
NATO instructors from Canada and France. They also contributed to
Ukraine’s National Defense Academy program called “International
Weeks,” during which U.S. and NATO speakers lecture Ukrainian
student-ofﬁcers and their instructors on various security and defense
topics.
In addition, on June 17, 2004, Ukraine Defense Minister Yevgen
Marchuck and U.S. Ambassador John Herbst inaugurated the U.S.
sponsored Simulation Center in the National Defense Academy, the
ﬁrst of several such centers supplied by the United States to Ukrainian
military for the purpose of more efﬁcient ofﬁcer training for joint
and peacekeeping operations. The overall cost of the U.S. supplied
hardware, software, and training package is U.S.$5.4 million.
While Ukrainians go to the United States and some other NATO
countries under training and exchange programs, Americans study
in Ukraine, too. In 1997 two U.S. Army ofﬁcers attended a 4-month
course at Ukraine’s Army Institute in Kiev (now in Odessa). This
experience found its further application when U.S. ofﬁcers and cadets
from time to time have come to Ukraine to spend several months in a
Ukrainian military unit or institute.43
Overall, in regard to training as part of the interoperability
development process between the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries, past
experience has proved that many problems of Ukraine’s military
training could be corrected. Decisions have been made to emphasize
command and control interoperability: to introduce a Joint “Jstructure” for Ukrainian headquarters and adopt NATO standards.
Ukrainian ofﬁcers, in fact, have two sets of standards―the old Soviet
ones for combat and new NATO ones for peacekeeping.
In terms of the speciﬁc training of Ukrainian units, a broader
use of training simulators is envisioned. But removing the negative
impact on the training process of such factors as Ukrainian conscript
manning, very limited resources, and virtual absence of professional
NCO corps will require more time. If current positive trends continue,
it will still take at least 5-10 years for the Ukrainian military to become
qualiﬁed at a satisfactory NATO level.
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Doctrine.
The problem of bringing Ukrainian military doctrines closer to the
American ones was a need primarily emphasized by the U.S. side. At
the turn of the decade, there was a feeling of some disappointment
because of the alleged lack of enthusiasm on the Ukrainian side to
utilize Western doctrine. With regard to the period of cooperation
up to 2000, Colonel Simmeth summarized:
Familiarity with each other’s doctrines [is] partly successful. Ukraine’s
military is now more familiar with U.S. and Western doctrine through
exercises, exchanges, and cooperation in the Balkans. The reverse is also
true. But the hope in the West was that Ukraine would ﬁnd Western
doctrine useful in pursuit of military reform. It does not seem that this is
the case.44

Colonel Simmeth’s assessment was founded in the U.S. concept
that doctrine tells a force what it needs to be able to do and to what
standards. Thus from that, it may derive other conclusions such as
what resource allocations, training programs, etc., rationally are
necessary. In this sense, doctrine can serve as an “engine of change”
for reform, particularly at the operational level and above. That
Ukraine’s limited reform progress up to 2000 was perceived at least
in part to be hampered by a failure to reform doctrine thoroughly is
not surprising.
Such a conclusion is natural as well for the United States in the
area of interoperability, given its perception of the great importance of
doctrinal compatibility for effective combined operations. U.S. Major
General Krawciw noted, for example: “Doctrinal interoperability in
joint and combined operations may well constitute the difference
between ensuring the well-being and success of those sent into
combat, or risking failure and loss of lives because of inadequate
procedures and tactics.”45 Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General John Shalikashvili emphasized this idea to a visiting
Ukrainian General Ofﬁcer delegation in 1996 when the latter
expressed the desire to obtain more U.S.-made military equipment
“for the sake of interoperability.” The Chairman explained his belief
that we:
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do not all have to buy the same equipment to be interoperable . . . but
our doctrine and techniques for employing that equipment should be
compatible. This means having the same or similar operational doctrine,
and understanding where that doctrine differs and why, as well as having
compatible equipment standards.46

Overall, many Americans, after gaining experience in cooperating
with Ukrainian troops, acknowledge their “fundamental” competence at individual and tactical levels plus good discipline. But at
the same time, there is probably a consensus on the U.S. side about
the weakness of Ukrainians in the areas of operational level doctrine
and doubts about the operational competence of at least some of the
mid-top leadership.
However, since the year 2000, and even during the prior period
of bilateral military cooperation, the U.S. doctrinal inﬂuence on
Ukrainian military was quite signiﬁcant. Though Ukrainians
always have attempted to base their system of developing major
doctrinal documents primarily on their own intellectual resources,
there was no doubt that experience received through military-tomilitary contacts played a very important role in this process. This
experience came through many familiarization cooperative events,
as well as through joint training exercises, the open sharing of U.S.
doctrinal publications, and, of course, through graduates of the IMET
Program.47
The U.S. experience undoubtedly has inﬂuenced the adoption
of Ukrainian key doctrinal concepts like creation of the RRF and of
the Active Reserve (State Program, 2000) and the 2002 decision on
turning to all-volunteer manning by 2015. Occasional U.S. and other
NATO countries’48 doctrinal recommendations play an ever more
inﬂuential role in many speciﬁc areas of Ukrainian defense reform.
For instance, EUCOM’s Defense Analysis Report on the RRF
has made a signiﬁcant impact on the development of the Ukrainian
manual, “Fundamentals of preparation and application of the Joint
Rapid Reaction Force.” Another good example, according to Ukraine’s
Minister of Defense Yevghen Marchuk, “The U.S. program DRMM
(Defense Resource Management Model) is utilized in development
of a well-balanced prospective force structure for the Armed Forces
of Ukraine 2015 in terms of determining realistic resource allocations
needed for this.”49
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Other individual NATO countries such as Canada, Germany,
Poland, and the UK provide important support to Ukraine’s doctrinal
development in the form of general military reform analysis, training,
and education of military personnel, personnel management systems,
etc.
Starting from 2001, NATO teams of experts in cooperation
with Ukrainians launched several pilot projects to develop
recommendations for some speciﬁc areas like Ukraine’s Naval
force structure reform, reintegration of retired military personnel,
and disposal of ammunition and small arms. In doctrinal terms,
the most promising results and prospects are shown within a naval
pilot project, where a NATO team in concert with U.S. experts has
passed the stage of recommendation development and is helping
Ukrainians to implement a new force structure in the Ukrainian
Navy, establish a naval combat information center, adopt NATO
standards for Naval headquarters, and improve the Navy’s system
of logistic support.50 And, Western experience in general clearly was
taken into account in the recently adopted new version of Ukraine’s
operational-strategic doctrine, “Fundamentals of preparation and
application of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”
There are many recent indications of genuine progress by the
Ukrainians on the operational doctrine level of interoperability.
However, the issue of leadership remains for U.S. counterparts an
area of some disappointment. The lower level leadership problem―
reinforced by the weakness of the Ukrainian NCO Corps―was
recognized by both sides long ago, and consequent priority attention
was given to this, bringing visible improvements. The solution at
higher levels is a bit more problematic.
Perhaps foremost, the decisionmaking style adopted by the senior
Ukrainian leadership seems to frustrate the United States. It is a familiar
thing to complain of the “Ukrainian tendency to over-centralize both
decisionmaking and execution,” which is in vivid contrast to the U.S.
military doctrinal standard of “centralized planning and direction
and decentralized execution.” Some Americans recognize that this
is not simply a case of bad leaders with poor leadership ability, but
rather a cultural and organizational tendency, reinforced by a legacy
of Soviet over-centralization. But it remains frustrating to most, who
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view it as an impediment to efﬁcient planning and reform progress
overall.
Another point of discontent, which has to do with adoption of the
U.S. doctrinal experience, is the currently rather slow development
of a Ukrainian system of “lessons learned.” It took a long time for
Ukrainians to recognize how important it is to have an effective
multilevel system of lessons learned. While this problem ﬁnally was
recognized, it is still unclear as to when Ukrainians will be able to ﬁll
the current gap between regular units’ experiences and the ability
of the central military research institutions to gather and distribute
these experiences along with suggested “best practices.” This
problem is characteristic for both operational experiences and the
way Ukrainians manage their resources. Prominent NATO experts
on Ukraine Christopher Donnelly and James Greene have stated,
with regard to the Ukrainian resource management problem which
is of the same nature as “lessons learned” problem, that:
More important than Rapid Reaction Forces or moving to contract
service is the issue of managing resources . . . The system also needs to
evaluate program results . . . For such system to work, it must be able
to accurately measure and predict costs, both for current force structure
and programs, and for alternatives. This is difﬁcult in any armed forces;
in a post-communist system the challenge is huge; intensive foreign
assistance will be needed.51

Ukraine needs to adopt an effective system of reporting, analyzing,
summarizing, and disseminating important lessons learned, as well
as a methodology by which to compare these lessons to doctrine and
thereby identify any doctrinal gaps or errors. U.S. experts suggest
capitalizing much more on its experience in order to reduce waste of
resources, prevent repeating the same mistakes, and disseminating
innovative solutions and practices.
Overall, while Ukrainians actually adopted a lot of positive
U.S. experiences for their Navy, military education system, and
peacekeeping doctrine; the remaining problems with resources and
bureaucratic shortsightedness noticeably slowed wider application
of doctrinal lessons. It is important to remember, however, that
there are natural limits to doctrinal aspects of interoperability, since
in practical terms, it is still a bit early to talk about U.S.-Ukrainian
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military cooperation beyond peacekeeping, and Ukraine is not
a member of NATO yet. According to many well-known expert
estimates, even some U.S. NATO allies and other European partners
often are considered not to be fully combat interoperable with the
United States, and sometimes even not fully trusted.
In general, in terms of doctrinal interoperability, the two sides
already are beyond the familiarization stage. Ukrainians started a
number of important changes to adopt their force structure, staff
procedures, peacekeeping operations, and logistical system to U.S.
and NATO standards. However, problems remain with the full
adoption of Western combat doctrines and with the leadership/
decisionmaking style. When a speciﬁc joint mission is envisioned,
Ukrainians simply adapt personnel to this mission’s Rules of
Engagement (ROE) and multinational staff procedures. The core
of Ukrainian combat doctrine is considered to be not radically
different or deﬁcient to that of the United States. The comprehensive
adaptation of manuals, headquarters’ techniques, and leadership
styles to U.S. and NATO models is not seriously on the agenda yet.
And to ensure effective implementation of doctrinal change, there
likely will need to be a longer-term deeper “cultural” change (and
possibly a generational change) in the Ukrainian military and in the
minds and styles of its members. Any more sudden radical “change
of minds and styles” of the senior Ukrainian military leadership―
especially when this is not strongly encouraged by their political
masters―appears highly unlikely.
Technical Systems.
Given the scarcity of resources that the Ukrainian authorities
are willing to allocate for the country’s military armaments and
equipment needs, the issue of technical systems interoperability has
not been solved, not even by adoption of the “compatible equipment
standards” noted by General Shalikashvili. The “solution” basically
was left to the good will of the United States in donating or helping to
fund the purchase of military equipment under its FMF program, the
“Warsaw initiative,” and other programs. In addition to Ukrainian
ﬁnancial limitations, it took a long time for the two countries
to negotiate and sign the necessary background agreements on
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military-technical cooperation, which also blocked the development
of more intensive contacts in this area. There is also a history of the
United States buying small batches of Ukrainian weapons and other
products for military use, but these amounts never exceeded several
million dollars per year.
Still, in terms of cooperation in peacekeeping, the United States
has provided quite a lot of equipment to make Ukrainian units
technically interoperable. This concerns primarily Ukrainian military
contingents in Kosovo and Iraq. For instance, under FMF, in FY
2000 Ukraine purchased HUMVEEs with tactical radios and other
communication equipment. In FY 2001 Ukraine purchased additional
HUMVEEs with tactical radios, other four-wheel-drive vehicles,
and night-vision goggles.52 In FY 2002 Ukraine used FMF funds to
purchase, among other things, automation and simulation equipment
and additional military tactical radios and communications systems,
as well as to help develop a simulation center to support peacekeeper
training.53 This pattern continued in FY 2003. A certain number
of radios and data-transmission equipment also were supplied
to Ukrainian peacekeeping units from funds provided under the
“Warsaw initiative.”
This kind of support naturally helped to cover only the immediate
needs of Ukrainian units to be interoperable with their U.S., Polish,
and other partners in Kosovo and in Iraq. However, ambitions to
join NATO pushed the Ukrainian military to declare its intention
to equip all units with interoperable communication equipment,
for which purpose the plans for international tender in 2004 were
announced. Among the bidders Ukrainians expected to see wellestablished producers, such as Siemens, Motorola, Tadiran, and
others.54
Ukrainians supplied some of their equipment to the United
States as well, but these supplies were of a different nature. First,
Ukrainians were selling, not donating, or helping anyone to fund
their equipment. While the list of this equipment includes some
Ukrainian tanks, combat vehicles, missiles, artillery systems, and even
training aircraft, these sales have nothing to do with interoperability
and were evidently purchased for different purposes. At a minimum
these sales bring some initial experience of military-technical
cooperation, which could possibly become helpful in the future, if
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Ukraine continues to plan for acquisition of western interoperable
equipment beyond communication systems.
Ukraine also provides the United States and other NATO nations
with a signiﬁcant amount of airlift, especially in cases of very large
and very heavy cargo. It possesses a sizable ﬂeet of Antonov-124
(Ruslan) and Iliushyn-76 Candid cargo aircraft, as well as the biggest
plane in the world, the Antonov-225 (Mriya), capable of carrying a
240-tons maximum load. These aircraft were used in 2003 to deliver
U.S. equipment to Kuwait and Iraq.
In fact, theoretical opportunities exist for future close military
technical connections, given some of Ukraine’s unique technological
capabilities in the ﬁelds of space, transport aircraft, shipbuilding,
missile, radar, and other production. But for this to become true,
Ukraine will need to become a real “strategic partner.” Beyond
today’s rather declarative political rhetoric, this is likely to occur only
in the more distant future. This is the reason why, despite genuine
interest on both sides to expedite military technical cooperation
and despite available technological potential, the issue of technical
systems interoperability probably lags behind most other main issues
of interoperability.
Overall, the results of U.S.-Ukraine peacetime military
engagement could be termed effective but not efﬁcient. On the one
hand, bilateral cooperative mechanisms have allowed for the conduct
of a great number of useful familiarizing and training events and
for the running several important joint projects. These events and
projects have created the necessary conditions for the overall positive
development of bilateral military cooperation and established a
foundation for cooperation in practical deployments. On the other
hand, so far the effect of these cooperative events on the progress
of Ukraine’s defense reforms has been mixed, and the process of
strengthening Ukraine’s military interoperability with U.S. and
NATO militaries has proceeded at a rather slow pace. This reﬂects
remaining shortcomings on the Ukrainian side in terms of improving
language and doctrinal interoperability, as well as the rather
insigniﬁcant efforts to improve technical systems interoperability.
Most important, the Ukrainian side corrects problems only very
slowly because its own internal system of the lessons learned still is
very underdeveloped.
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PART IV
ACCOMPLISHING MISSIONS TOGETHER
Actual operational experience provides the greatest learning environment.
Therefore, continuing Ukrainian participation in peace operations . . .
should be considered as very important.
Nicholas Krawciw55

Ukraine’s participation in many UN and Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping operations and in
stabilization operations in Iraq makes it possible for the Ukrainian
military to gain new experiences from working with the armed
forces of other countries. Most importantly, this participation has
tested the value of peacetime engagement and allowed Ukraine to
improve interoperability with the United States and NATO partners,
thus building the foundation for possible cooperation in future low
intensity conﬂicts. The United States and Ukraine have cooperated
most closely in accomplishing peacekeeping and combat missions
together in Kosovo and Iraq. These experiences so far represent the
most important instances of interoperability development, though
many other operations could also suggest plenty of lessons from
working together.
Kosovo.
At ﬁrst, the Ukrainian KFOR contingent, consisting of the 14th
Helicopter Company and the 37th Maintenance Company (replaced
by a mechanized company in July 2000), was deployed to Macedonia,
where it remained from July until December 1999. This time
primarily was used to prepare for further deployment to Kosovo,
to train troops for future missions, and to learn NATO standards
and ROE. In December the Ukrainians moved to Kosovo, where they
were based at Camp Bondsteell with the MNB “East” under U.S.
command.
Among the many examples of joint actions between Ukraine
and the United States in Kosovo, two are particularly interesting for
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study of interoperability. The ﬁrst case involved the protection of
the ﬁrst democratic elections in Kosovo in October 2000. For KFOR’s
operational reserve, consisting of British and Greek infantry troops
mounted on seven helicopters (three Ukrainian and four American),
the mission was to move a multinational force anywhere throughout
Kosovo quickly to provide extra security and additional forces for the
municipal elections. To demonstrate the resolve of KFOR to secure
peace and order prior to the election day of October 28, the strength
demonstration, codenamed “Air Insertion Exercise,” was conducted
in an open ﬁeld close to the town of Gnjilane.
The period of intense preparation was meant to demonstrate the
readiness of KFOR’s operational reserve to protect and secure the
ﬁrst free, democratic political elections in Kosovo. According to an
observer’s report:
Coming in formations of three and three, the helicopters touched down
in turn to drop off heavily equipped British and Greek infantry soldiers
who ran bowed into their positions, waiting for the soldier deployment
to be fulﬁlled. This joint helicopter force consisted of three American UH60 Black Hawks and three Ukrainian Mi-8 Hips, all very well-coordinated
and obviously familiar with this type of assignment. As soon as the last
helicopter, an American CH-47 Chinook, touched the ground, the ﬁrst
formation of three helicopters took off again, immediately followed by
the second formation. Shortly afterwards, the Chinook was also emptied
and back in the air, chasing the six helicopters ahead. Left in the ﬁeld
were seven groups of soldiers.56

The scenario of the exercise was rather simple―it envisioned a
demonstration of the unopposed deployment of the multinational
KFOR Operational Reserve into a small ﬁeld near the town. However,
the message was powerful: “There should be no doubt that the
Kosovo Force is ready to deal with any problems that might occur in
connection with Kosovo’s ﬁrst municipal elections.”57 Judging by the
conduct of the elections, it worked well.
According to Ukrainian peacekeeping experts, this episode in
KFOR’s mission marked a noticeable improvement in coordinated
actions between Ukrainian and U.S. and NATO forces, compared to
their previous deployments to Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)
in the 1990s.
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Another illustrative story which involved the Ukrainian and
U.S. infantry took place in Kosovo on February 13, 2001. Ukrainian
peacekeepers escorted a convoy of Serbian civilians through the
mountains to the municipal center of Strpce. A sniper (allegedly
Albanian) opened ﬁre, apparently aiming at one of the bus drivers,
but shot an elderly Serb instead. Ukrainian peacekeepers deployed
immediately and searched the nearby slopes, where they found
several Albanian males and detained them. Later in the evening
a Serbian crowd of over 500 gathered around the local UN police
station as a “spontaneous protest against the killing of the elderly
Serb.” The situation became tense as Ukrainian peacekeepers formed
a circle around the station with the UN police contingent (including
U.S. military police) inside while the crowd attempted to break in. At
some point, the UN police station chief started ﬁring in the air and
aiming his gun at the crowd. This move ignited the mob―Molotov
cocktails were thrown at the station, stones were hurled at Ukrainian
peacekeepers, and ﬁve police cars were burned or destroyed.
The crowd was growing when Ukrainian company commander
Captain Brezgounov entered the station with four soldiers and
suggested the policemen evacuate. They hesitated when they
learned that the Ukrainians were in small numbers. When the
policemen were ﬁnally in Ukrainian vehicles, the crowd blocked
their movement. Then support suddenly came from outside―U.S.
HUMMVees rammed through the hastily-erected Serbian barricades
on the outskirts of Strpce and raced to the aid of the Ukrainians.
The senior U.S. ofﬁcer present, Colonel Kamena, decided to address
the crowd. As he approached, the crowd seized him, but Ukrainian
peacekeepers led by the same Captain Brezgounov broke into the
crowd and pulled the U.S. ofﬁcer out of it. Within 24 hours, MNB
“East” commander U.S. Brigadier General Quinlan awarded Captain
Brezgounov with a NATO medal for outstanding performance.
This episode showed evident reluctance on the part of the UN
police to cooperate with the Ukrainian KFOR troops. There was
also some evidence of lack of coordination between the U.S. and
Ukrainian troops once the action began. This could be attributed to
a lack of proper advanced planning, but there was no doubt about
the trust and support between the Americans and the Ukrainians.
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Ukrainian veterans still gratefully recall that, immediately after this
action, the U.S. troops supplied them with better antiriot equipment,
which the Ukrainians initially lacked.
However, the two sides’ military newspapers reported the
incident quite differently. While the Ukrainian Narodna Armiya58 did
not hesitate to describe broadly and praise the role of both Ukraine
and the United States, the U.S. Stars and Stripes,59 in describing the
incident, wrote a story about the role of the Americans, but said
nothing about the role of Ukrainian peacekeepers that day, merely
mentioning someone’s proposal to assign U.S. troops as convoy
escorts instead of unnamed “KFOR troops.”
This difference in coverage might have to do with U.S. political
leadership not wishing to publicize a danger to their troops, even
though the U.S. forces on the scene recognized the action for what it
was. This could be an example of trying to avoid the “CNN factor”―
the story of U.S. soldiers being surrounded and having to be rescued
by anyone could have produced public or political backlash. But this
lack of publicity was perceived by some Ukrainians as reluctance to
note their important role.
Since then, both the composition and the mission of Ukrainian
contingent have changed. In 2001, Ukrainian helicopters were
withdrawn, and Ukrainian troops were represented by two
companies of the Ukrainian-Polish joint peacekeeping battalion,
UKRPOLBAT, and the staff element. By the start of 2004, they are
still serving within the U.S.-led MNB “East,” patrolling the area near
the Kosovo border with Macedonia along with the United States.
The situation has become more peaceful, and the troops devote a
great deal of time to training together. As observed by UKRPOLBAT
Deputy Commander Ukrainian Army Major Serhij Heraimovich,
Our soldiers participate in all MNB(E) training offered at Camp
Bondsteel. Especially our medics are training on a regular basis with their
American counterparts. There are also many professional development
and language skills programs for our sergeants in the United States prior
to being sent on this mission.60

This training and these bonds naturally help during joint
actions:
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Since arriving in the theater, the Ukrainian and American soldiers have
conducted joint patrols. According to [Ukrainian] Senior Sergeant Andrej
Chernata, these patrols have been very interesting: “Especially during
joint patrols, we have the opportunity to share knowledge and our shared
goals of security.”61

Iraq.
The story of Ukraine-U.S. cooperation in Iraq begins with the
deployment of the Ukrainian CBR-protection battalion to Kuwait
during the active hostilities period of March-April 2003. The battalion
was deployed by Ukrainian air transport to Kuwait 2 weeks after
hostilities began.
This ﬁrst deployment to the zone of hostilities near the Iraqi border
proved several things. The problem of the individual equipment
of Ukrainian personnel remained, as was the case in Kosovo, and
the United States again provided support on the spot with some
basic equipment including uniforms, protection gear, and footwear.
But there was no doubt about the professionalism of Ukrainian
personnel and the readiness of their combat equipment. In addition,
the Ukrainians were located at the same base as the Americans,
which added once again to their knowledge and appreciation of
each other.
Though Ukrainian 19th CBR-protection battalion did not take
part in active combat action, in August the third “special” battalion
of Ukraine’s 5th Separate Mechanized Brigade was formed from
elements of this battalion. As far as follow-up deployment of the
Ukrainian 5th Mechanized Brigade and higher staff elements to
Iraq is concerned, the announcement was made in May 2003 during
the conference in Warsaw on foreign troops’ contribution to the
stabilization operation. Though the news about the U.S. proposal
to deploy a brigade headquarters and two battalions to Iraq (made
to Ukraine earlier that month) was known previously, Ukraine’s
agreement still came as a surprise for many. When the Ukrainian
proposal ofﬁcially was made, according to witnesses, there was at
ﬁrst a moment of silence evidently caused by this surprise. Then
some of those present started to ask their neighbors again to conﬁrm
whether they had understood the Ukrainian offer correctly. When
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it was conﬁrmed by Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Major General Oleg Sivushenko, the U.S. Marine ofﬁcer present at
the conference, who had just arrived from Iraq, could not hide his
pleasure―”My people will go home!”62
After 3 months of intense preparations, in which U.S., Canadian,
and British instructors took part, the Ukrainian contingent was
fully deployed to Iraq in accordance with the schedule by August
17, 2003. Not everything went smoothly, and the heads of the
Ukrainian MOD’s armaments and logistic headquarters paid for this
with their positions, as did several other high-ranking Ukrainian
ofﬁcers. Nonetheless, overall, after the previous deployment to
Kuwait, this next deployment to Iraq once again proved the ability
of the Ukrainians to deploy in time, relying primarily on their own
airlift capability while partly using foreign sealift when necessary.
The Americans, who pledged to compensate the Ukrainians for
the transportation cost of both deployments―to Kuwait and Iraq―
praised this ability.
The Ukrainian brigade was to replace the 3rd Marine Battalion at
al-Kut, the capital of Wasit province in Iraq, southeast of Baghdad on
a 140-km long sector of Iraqi border with Iran. The substitution was
planned to be ﬁnished in 2 weeks. The ﬁrst week, both the Ukraine
and the United States had to accomplish missions together. During
the second week, only instructors remained on the U.S. side to help
Ukrainian personnel adjust. From early September, the Ukrainians
assumed full responsibility for Wasit province’s peace and order.
According to Ukrainian participant accounts,63 as soon as the
ﬁrst elements of the 5th Brigade stepped onto Kuwaiti and then Iraqi
soil, U.S. military personnel gave them comprehensive support. The
United States helped in the organization of transportation, security,
rations, deployment of personnel, and supply of the equipment
for the Ukrainian military contingent. At brieﬁngs, as well as in
everyday communication, the experienced U.S. troops continuously
gave practical advice on how to operate in a hot climate, what to be
careful of, what to do if someone gets sunstroke, how to maintain
communications and orient oneself in an unfamiliar environment,
how to act when under attack, etc.
At the Kut airﬁeld, the command of the U.S. Marine battalion,
which was to transfer control to the Ukrainian brigade, did everything
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to ensure that its comrades-in-arms would not be starting from
scratch. Almost every day U.S. personnel met with personnel of the
Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent and transferred their experience
in performing their duties. Speciﬁcally, the 19th Separate Special
Battalion, which was slotted to take over the defense of the Kut
airﬁeld, was given complete information about the most dangerous
sectors of the perimeter of this large installation. The Marines told
the Ukrainians about various incidents that had occurred over the 5
months since the operation began. They also shared their observations
of the behavior of the residents of the city.
The specialists of the marine engineer unit were just as concerned
with the health and lives of the Ukrainians. They collected and
displayed a huge exhibit of the explosive devices that had been found
on the former military airﬁeld. The U.S. sappers fully characterized
each mine, device, and grenade and recounted the story of an
unfortunate incident involving two of their soldiers. At some points,
Ukrainian and U.S. sappers had to work together to demine the
territory of the airﬁeld, which they did with understanding and trust
in each other.
The company of the U.S. military police proved particularly helpful
to the military police platoon of the Ukrainian brigade. The speciﬁc
nature of assignments involving the patrol of the unknown city of Kut
and the detention of law-breakers demanded special knowledge and
practices. Thanks to the efforts of U.S. Captain Terry Dorn, Ukrainian
peacekeepers were able to master the service quickly. Almost every
night in the U.S. or Ukrainian headquarters, one could witness the
examination and analysis of the joint operations in the city by this
young woman. According to Ukrainian accounts, “Captain Dorn
was concerned for the Ukrainians as if for her brothers. She wanted
everything to turn out as it should and to avoid human losses.”64
The joint cooperation of the Ukrainian and U.S. military, which
began with transmission of operational experience, continued after
the marines’ departure, when the task of training an Iraqi territorial
self-defense battalion was carried out jointly. The Ukrainians were
responsible for selection and medical examination of Iraqi personnel,
while training was organized together with U.S. instructors.
An interesting moment was recalled by a Ukrainian CIMIC
ofﬁcer. When head of the brigade’s CIMIC section Lieutenant
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Colonel Veleriy Kuzmin ﬁrst approached local contractors, he was
stunned by the previous practice. His U.S. predecessors allegedly
were providing payments for orders without attempting to verify
the local price for speciﬁc jobs and without any competitive bidding.
This led to locals extracting large sums of money for rather simple
and inexpensive orders. Therefore, in order to reduce waste, he
had to exert strong efforts and experience conﬂicts to break the
habits of many local contractors spoiled by U.S. generosity.65 This
is an interesting “role reversal” for the United States and Ukraine,
considering the complaints by Americans that the Ukrainians made
the same errors and encouraged “price-gouging” in the early days
of U.S.-Ukraine military contacts (see Part II). It appears that the
Ukrainians had paid attention to the “lessons learned” from that
earlier military cooperation, and as a result may actually have had
more experience and knowledge on this subject than the U.S. units
involved in this particular operation.
Another example, which might have something in common with
the internal U.S. debate about the “tough” Army versus “liberal”
Marine approaches to local population in the occupied territories,66
was observed in the Iraqi town of Suwayrah by a Los Angeles Times
correspondent:
. . . Some residents are happy that the Ukrainians have taken over from
the Americans, who they complained insulted residents and showed
disrespect to Iraqi women when raiding homes or conducting body
searches. “The Ukrainians treat us in a very nice way, completely different
from the Americans,” said Adnan Hamid Abbas, a lawyer. “They never
shout at us.” But others said the Ukrainians’ easygoing nature meant
they were not as aggressive as the Americans in eradicating supporters
of Saddam Hussein or resistance ﬁghters who were staging attacks in the
area. “The Ukrainians are cowards, while the Americans are tough,” said
Ghasan Ali Izzi, a television shopkeeper. “I prefer the Americans.”67

Whatever the pros and cons, perhaps an analysis of the more “liberal”
Ukrainian approach may yield lessons applicable to the internal U.S.
debate.
Outside the Ukrainian 5th Brigade, the ofﬁcers of the Ukrainian
staff element at the higher “Center-South” division headquarters
and at the Coalition headquarters, who were working together with

60

Americans, Poles, Spaniards, and other allies, on many occasions
recognized the valuable experience they received during joint
peacetime training, joint peacekeeping missions, and at the courses
for multinational staff ofﬁcers in Kiev. This experience allowed them
to be interoperable with their U.S. partners and other nationals in
Iraq.
Regarding the preliminary analysis of the ﬁrst rotation of the
Ukrainian brigade to Iraq, the United States appeared basically
satisﬁed, based on the overall ability of Ukrainians to deploy to the
theater of operation and perform the assigned mission. However,
honest feedback from Polish partners―who have had the opportunity
to cooperate closely with the Ukrainian brigade on an everyday basis
within a joint formation―has been more speciﬁc and more critical,
particularly concerning the low level of English proﬁciency among
Ukrainian ofﬁcers in Iraq and the slow pace of forming and training
the brigade to the required standard.68
During the second rotation of Ukrainian troops in Iraq, when
6th Brigade was substituted for the 5th Brigade in February-March
2004, the events in Wasit province, as everywhere in Iraq, took more
dramatic turn. In addition to routine instances of cooperation of
the U.S. and Ukrainian sappers, medics, logisticians, etc., several
combat engagements took place. At the start of clashes with the
militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada-al-Sadr, on April 6-7, two Ukrainian
mechanized platoons for 2 days defended the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) building at the capital of Wasit province, the city
of Kut, and another Ukrainian mechanized platoon defended the
bridge over the Tigris River. They withstood a 4-hour long attack
by overwhelming numbers of Sadr militia and further attempts to
blow the CPA administrative building, as well as continuous mortar
and RPG attacks. They suffered one dead and ﬁve wounded, while
killing over a hundred attackers. Two U.S. F-16s and later two Apache
helicopters came and left without ﬁring a shot or launching a missile
apparently because of problems with target identiﬁcation and lack
of coordination with Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian detachment managed to evacuate safely 37 U.S.
and 6 Polish civilian personnel under their protection from the siege.
According to Ukrainian ofﬁcial sources, this was done at the request
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of U.S. civilian CPA personnel. Two U.S. Apache helicopters covered
the retreat.
Unfortunately, many U.S. newspapers reported the incident in
slightingly negative tones, as if Ukrainian troops simply abandoned
the city of Kut (some 250,000 inhabitants!) to the Sadr militia. In fact,
it never was a mission of the lightly armed Ukrainian detachment
to hold the city. Their mission was to do exactly what they had
done―to provide for security of civilian administration―which they
accomplished with tactical brilliance. Law and order at Kut were
restored soon after by the U.S. combat brigade, so in the aftermath,
it is perfectly clear that, opposite hasty media accusations, there was
no need for the Ukrainian company to replicate another Stalingrad
and risk the lives of civilians and their own.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell thanked Ukrainian allies in
his letter dated April 9 to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn
Hryshchenko. Powell highly praised the courage and bravery
shown by the Ukrainian troops, particularly during the events in the
city of Kut. During retaking control of Kut, the Ukrainian battalion
stationed near the city performed a supporting role and later renewed
patrolling the city and conducting searches. For instance, during the
ﬁrst day, they detained three militiamen pretending to be ﬁre-ﬁghters
and discovered a large weapons cache. The other two Ukrainian
battalions from the 6th Brigade were not engaged in serious combat:
one was doing border guard duty defending the 80 miles long border
with Iran (they also had seizures of large amounts of weapons), and
the third battalion was busy with de-mining, patrolling, and CIVIC
missions. Associated Press reported the events:
U.S. troops drove into Kut before dawn Friday, pushing out members
of the militia headed by radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that had
seized the southern textile and farming center this week after Ukrainian
troops abandoned the city under heavy attack. . . . Brigadier General
Mark Kimmitt said he expected the operation to retake Kut from alSadr’s al-Mahdi Army militia would be ﬁnished by Saturday morning. . . .
Kimmitt told CNN he believed there were 300-400 al-Sadr militants in
Kut on Thursday night who had been trying “to intimidate the people”
in the city of about 250,000. The Kut operation represented a major foray
by the American military in a region where U.S. allies have struggled to
deal with the uprising.69
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However, the attacks on Ukrainian troops in Wasit province
continued, and on April 19, a Ukrainian patrol on three armored
personnel carriers was attacked by a large group of terrorists, which
detonated two roadside bombes and opened ﬁre from RPG and
small arms. The Ukrainians returned ﬁre, killing ﬁve and wounding
seven. In another similar ambush on April 28, 2004, the Ukrainian
patrol was less fortunate, when two Ukrainians died and ﬁve were
wounded.
But in the latter case, as in other similar cases, U.S. MEDEVAC
helicopters and U.S. medical personnel did everything possible
to save wounded Ukrainians. U.S. attack helicopters always were
ready to provide ﬁre support. However, certain problems of
coordination between Ukrainian and U.S. troops became evident,
so in the aftermath of the April-May events in Wasit province, U.S.
CENTCOM supplied the Ukrainian brigade with an additional
number of U.S. radios, which Ukrainians had in limited quantity.
At home, Ukrainian leftists immediately accelerated campaigning
on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Iraq. This campaign,
along with absence of a balanced and positive coverage in foreign
press, made it more difﬁcult for Ukrainian authorities to explain to
the public why Ukrainians are dying in Iraq.
Again, as in the case of events in Kosovo in February 2001, the
lack of appreciation by the U.S. media was perceived by Ukrainians
as reluctance to note their important role in dramatic April-May 2004
events in Iraq. Overall, Ukrainian participation in the stabilization
operation in Iraq, as previously in Kosovo, has provided a new
opportunity to gain real-life experience, to learn from each other, and
to test the value of peacetime engagement. These ultimate tests of
doctrine, training, and equipment generally have shown that, while
Ukraine is capable of consistently producing ad hoc successes, a more
systemic approach is needed to develop a stable, long-term capability
for deploying interoperable units. The repetition of previously
recognized problems strongly suggests that interoperability issues
should be included in a system of regular review of operations,
training, and doctrine―that is, a mandatory part within a more
speciﬁc and effective Ukrainian “lessons learned” system.
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PART V
CONCLUSIONS
The principal U.S. approach to cooperation with Ukraine, a postSoviet nation with long and complex history, has consistently been
to help in building a stable, prosperous democracy that can become a
viable economic and security partner to the West. An important role
in these efforts belongs to military cooperation: within the bilateral
military-to-military contacts programs, within NATO partnership
events, and through the practical accomplishment of peacekeeping
and humanitarian missions.
In the course of 13 years of cooperation, Ukraine and the United
States have gone through periods of cautious rapprochement, inﬂated
expectations of “strategic partnership,” and sober reevaluation.
Ukraine’s recent ambitious declaration of intent to become a NATO
member was welcomed by the United States, although cautiously,
given that Ukraine has not been very successful in building a ﬁrm
democratic foundation and conducting defense reform.
Although the search for the most appropriate political modus
vivendi for bilateral relations still continues, the military dimension
of the relations between two countries has always remained
cooperative. Most important is that in the military sphere there are
no insurmountable ideological, geopolitical, or cultural differences
between Ukraine and the United States. The history of military
cooperation has proven that, despite Ukraine’s many political and
economic problems, as well as those of a cultural and military nature
(bureaucracy and over-centralization, Soviet legacy of equipment
and doctrine), certain core interests provide ﬁrm ground on which
to continue mutually advantageous military cooperation. These
core interests are, at their most basic, U.S. willingness to support the
preservation of Ukraine’s independence as a key to regional security
and Ukrainian willingness to cooperate with the United States in
ﬁghting terrorism and preserving international peace.
The two countries have developed elaborate cooperative
mechanisms, which permit rather effective implementation of joint
events. The Ukrainian military appears genuinely to be interested in
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this cooperation, is generally technically and intellectually capable,
but is still a rather long way from compatibility with U.S. cultural
and doctrinal standards. But if we consider the starting point, the
results are impressive.
At the start of their cooperation, there was practically no ground
to talk about interoperability in the traditional sense between U.S.
and Ukrainian (post-Soviet) militaries.70 But 13 years of military
cooperation have allowed for achieving certain limited progress
in major interoperability areas between the U.S. and Ukrainian
militaries. As a result, the relationship has grown from simple
peacetime engagement to conducting successful combined peacekeeping operations.
As has happened so far, it is exactly in the area of peacekeeping
where the United States has needed―and will continue to need―the
Ukrainian military the most. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
have shown that the United States is capable of winning regional wars
without decisive support from its allies. But these campaigns also
have proved that the United States has signiﬁcant limits in providing
for post-conﬂict resolution (peacekeeping and peace-building)
without support from allies, even those as distant as Ukraine. This
is very important, since no war can be considered victorious if the
post-war situation deviates too far from prewar objectives.
For the United States, the experience of military cooperation
with Ukraine has proved that U.S. military contact programs and
peacetime engagement are a good way to understand the people with
whom you are engaging, and evaluating whether they are “really on
your side.” Quite likely, this experience also proved for the United
States an already known classical virtue of coalitions: they allow
smaller nations to feel important, while they allow stronger nations
to consider that others share the burden.
For Ukraine, military cooperation with the United States has
provided many opportunities for expediting reforms in the security
sector. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not been very successful in using
these opportunities. In particular, this is the result of the lack of
strong political direction and sufﬁcient funding, compounded by
the failure of Ukraine’s military to introduce a system to process the
lessons learned effectively. To alleviate partly the impact of Ukrainian
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problems, the country could have done better in developing its own
“U.S. specialists” to take some of the burden off the United States;
that is, to train enough “plug and play” liaison ofﬁcers.
If, for the sake of comparison, a third party―for example, new
NATO member and Ukraine’s neighbor, Poland―is used as an
indicator, the general conclusion would be that Ukrainians, as a
ﬁghting force, are not more deﬁcient than Poles. Rather, Ukrainians
are less interoperable in terms of language, doctrine, and equipment.
However, Ukraine has some unique capabilities it can provide, such
as airlift, missile/space, radars, tanks, CBR-testing and protection
equipment, and other high-tech possibilities.
Ukraine, indeed, has a lot of assets potentially to contribute to
combined operations with the United States, but the challenge
still remains how better to make them interoperable. In answer,
the results of this study generally point to the need for a twotier approach to interoperability: the ﬁrst tier being continued
efforts to develop compatible capabilities for the low intensity
conﬂict (peacekeeping); the second tier being the identiﬁcation
and improvement of complementary―rather than comparable―
capabilities for high intensity conﬂict.
At this moment, however, because of the number of political and
security reasons indicated above, in practical terms it is relevant to
speak primarily about the value of interoperability in the low intensity
conﬂict. To ensure continued success, more systemic approach to
U.S.-Ukraine military relations should be recommended.
First, given the total domination of the Army agenda in bilateral
military programs, consider shifting from the current practice
of appointing the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kiev from the U.S. Air
Force to more relevant and logical representation―from the U.S.
Army. For the same reason, Army program events should become
undisputed priorities of the Program of Bilateral U.S.-Ukraine
Military Cooperation.
Second, in order to develop a stable, long-term capability for
deploying interoperable Ukrainian units, a lot has already been done
and is currently planned to be done. But additional efforts are still
needed. These are:
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• Developing effective Ukrainian “lessons learned” systems, in
which interoperability issues should be included in regular
review of operations, training, and doctrine.
• Initiating the comprehensive and systemic adaptation of
Ukrainian manuals, headquarters’ techniques, and leadership
styles to U.S. and NATO models.
• Supporting Ukrainians in adapting wargaming techniques
to provide for interoperability at the strategic-operational
levels.
• Providing more focused support to the Ukrainian side in
training operational ofﬁcers capable of pursuing interoperability issues. To this end, establish the permanent placement of the U.S. instructors at the special courses for the
ofﬁcers of multinational staffs within the National Defense
Academy of Ukraine.
• Selecting and training Ukrainian instructors for Ukraine’s
National Academy of Defense and other relevant training facilities in view of their contribution to building interoperability.
• Helping transition from the current Ukrainian practice of
creating ad hoc units for missions abroad to deploying regular
units, ﬁrst of all, from Rapid Reaction Forces.
• Providing targeted support in equipping Ukrainian Rapid
Reaction Forces with interoperable command, control, and
communication equipment.
• Focusing joint training exercises on actual units, which will
deploy out of country.
Third, recognizing that success of Ukraine’s efforts in reforming
its military, particularly in increased interoperability, depends to a
signiﬁcant extent on success of wider governance reform. Ukraine
should consider more targeted efforts in training Ukrainian defense
experts from the staffs of the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers,
Administration of the President, National Security and Defense
Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, etc.
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As proved by the experience of practical missions together in
peacekeeping, human and intellectual factors (an understanding
of each others’ national and military cultures, common language)
are more important than technical systems. Thus for low intensity
conﬂict, “operational interoperability” (similar doctrines, planning
methods, training, and basic doctrinal/cultural understandings)
appears to be more important than “technical interoperability.”
But by deploying a brigade to Iraq, Ukraine has raised the
level of its cooperation to a new height, which will, in turn, be a
new test to the value of peacetime military cooperation. If, despite
all conceivable political and military problems, this new level of
cooperation is successful, it might open the door for partnership
beyond peacekeeping.
Thus, there are grounds to think that options for greater
interoperability for higher-intensity operations should be considered
as well. This analysis proves that the opportunities are there―but for
these to materialize, both countries’ militaries will need to continue
efforts to further strengthen the common capabilities and bonds that
U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation has already helped to build.
Overall, U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation has developed more
slowly and less efﬁciently than most U.S. participants have expected.
But given the magnitude of the nation-building challenge for Ukraine,
it could be assessed as a qualiﬁed success. This cooperation has
brought tangible results for both sides, as well as valuable lessons
for modern relations between the United States and post-totalitarian
states.
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70. Ralph Peters, Letter to the author, October 24, 2003.
The [U.S. and Soviet prior to 1991] systems were so profoundly different
that the only interoperability basis is simply that all are soldiers, with
some shared general knowledge and purpose, subject to discipline, etc.
But the functional systems and approaches to leadership and personnel
management are profoundly different. . . . I just do not see any doctrinal
common ground, whatsoever. . . as regards the present situation.
I expect a great many lessons have been learned, on both sides, from
interoperability requirements in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.
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APPENDIX
KEY INTERVIEWS
Major General (U.S. Army Ret.) Nicolas Krawciw,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Military-To-Military Relations
between USA and Ukraine

The principal American interest in Ukraine, for obvious regional
security and economic reasons, is in enhancing its independence and
democratic institutions. I believe that, for similar reasons, Ukraine’s
best interests are to become part of Europe.
Our current status of military cooperation with Ukraine became
somewhat stalled following the “Kolchuga” disclosures, but is
reviving as Ukraine, with its brigade in Iraq, is providing valuable
professional assistance. We are working with NATO HQ and with
other NATO countries to assist in Ukraine’s preparation for the
MAP process. Senior American government ofﬁcials are concerned
that some nasty aspects of Ukrainian election year power politics
may negatively inﬂuence NATO allies in their deliberations in
preparation for the Istanbul NATO Summit concerning the issuance
of an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO.
Not much has been achieved in technical military cooperation.
After long delays, the classiﬁed information agreement between
the United States and Ukraine has been signed last year. In time, if
relations remain on course, this may bear fruit in some meaningful
technical and technological cooperation.
Concerning cultural aspects of interoperability between our
militaries, I believe much has been achieved. We understand and
appreciate each other better. The intrinsic value of our exchanges
I describe in the second part of this message. I would like to add
that even the high level visits and exchanges have contributed to
our mutual understanding of our respective capabilities, methods,
politics, etc. Changes in senior Ukrainian military leadership
mindsets concerning threat deﬁnition, management, leadership,
military reform, and care of people have been progressive, visible,
and contribute to “cultural interoperability.” The best examples that
I can think of are these:
a. When we ﬁrst started the training exercises in Yavoriv and in
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the Black Sea, Ukrainian units were focused not so much on training
to achieve the training objectives of the exercise but to look good
in various demonstration vignettes at the “Opening Day,” or “VIP
Day,” or “Closing Day” when various high level visitors were
expected to attend. By 2000, this began to be changed to a focus on
exercise training objectives and visitors were shown what is actually
being achieved.
b. Similarly, discussions of defense reform over the last few years
turned from showcase brieﬁngs to discussions of what is feasible,
possible, and achievable based on available budgetary funding.
Events of this year [2004] will determine the future course of
our cooperation. In any case, we on the U.S. side will continue our
assistance to meaningful Ukrainian defense reform for as many years
as is necessary and is desired by Ukraine.
I would also provide comments on the main differences between
the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries. During the late 1970s, the U.S.
Army began a serious analysis of Soviet how-to-ﬁght doctrine. We
learned that Soviet highest level commanders had a signiﬁcant
amount of freedom of action at the strategic-operational level, but
less at the operational-tactical level, and very little at the tactical
level. We also knew of the impressive Soviet artillery and combat
engineer capabilities. Our post-Vietnam reform became oriented on
improvement of these two capabilities to try to match those of the
Soviet Union. However, at the operational tactical level, we felt that
we had the advantage in the way that our lower level commanders
(division down to battalion) planned and executed operations. The
system that evolved in Vietnam gave these commanders areas of
operation and general missions but would let them develop and
coordinate plans and actions within the assigned areas. That was
extended down to company level. Needless to say, that approach
stimulated individual initiative and contributed to leadership
development in the post-Vietnam period.
When we began our Partnership for Peace and other bilateral
exchanges with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 1994, it became clear
that many of the Soviet practices and organizational concepts that
still existed, while possibly useful for a major continental land war,
were not suited to small regional conﬂicts or to peacekeeping. There
were no planning staffs at regimental or battalion levels. Everything
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was being directed from the top. Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and
majors had very little leeway to change training schedules or to
inﬂuence organizational requirements. Equipment looked good, but
there were no funds to exercise or maintain it. We were told that, due
to a general lack of funding, force modernization apparently stopped
in the early 1980s. There was no real NCO corps; ofﬁcers were
performing tasks of seargeants. Inspections by higher commanders
or by the Inspector General were dreaded and not really systemic.
On the other hand, Ukrainian ofﬁcers were highly educated; many
showed a genuine interest in different ways of doing things.
Beginning in the summer of 1995, our “Peace Shield” exercises
in Yavoriv were designed to share our tactical and operational
methodologies with the Ukrainian Ground Forces (Ukrainian Army)
and with other participants. Similarly, the “Sea Breeze” Exercises in
1997 and 1998 were intended to assist the Ukrainian Navy to develop
its sea and shore based staffs. Most importantly, Ukrainian ofﬁcers
trained in the United States (IMET) and in other NATO countries
were bringing back to Ukraine better examples of various military
methodologies.
In my estimation, over the years, IMET, similar education in other
countries, actual peacekeeping operations, and various combined
ﬁeld or staff exercises, provided the Ukrainian Armed Forces with
various models of operational/tactical techniques more suited to
current real world situations and exposed Ukrainian participants to
the more open ways of conducting military affairs that exist in the
West. By the summer of 2000, we could see that certain directorates of
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense began to develop methodologies
for defense reform. In some cases, particularly in military education,
reforms started taking place. Plans were drawn up to develop an
all-volunteer enlisted force, with an NCO Corps at its core. As of the
end of last year, while budget and legislation dependent, the reforms
that are taking place; and those that are contemplated, particularly
the drawdown to much lower force levels and the restructuring to
brigade organizations, seem to be on the right track if Ukraine really
desires eventual NATO coalition security. We are now poised to assist
the Ukrainian Armed Forces in their preparation for participation
in NATO’s MAP once Ukraine receives NATO’s invitation for
membership.
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Higher morale, esprit de corps, lower level leadership, and
initiative will develop as the economy continues to improve,
as military personnel get better pay, and as political turbulence
diminishes. The ethical grounding of most Ukrainian ofﬁcers is
solid and will surface when the right political and senior military
leadership is in place. Examples of individual integrity at the highest
levels will assist in the grooming of better leadership at all levels of
command.
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Colonel (U.S. Army Ret.) Harry Simmeth,

former Branch and Division Chief, Joint Staff J-5 Strategy, Plans and Policy; and
former Commander, USA Opposing Force (OPFOR) Regiment, U.S. National
Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.

It is difﬁcult to pass a summary judgment on the overall value
of this cooperation, as it is subject to analysis on a number of levels.
For example, it clearly can be said to have paid large dividends in
the sense of preparing U.S. and Ukrainian forces to work together in
real-world contingency operations, e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and now
Iraq. However, part of the U.S. (and NATO) rationale in conducting
this cooperation was to encourage greater reform in the Ukrainian
armed forces. The latter effect, it seems to me, has been minimal
overall. If you want me to categorize it as “good or bad” overall,
however, I would have to say “good,” but I am disturbed at aspects
of the “negative side” of the equation.
For example, there still exists a tendency in the Ukrainian Defense
bureaucracy to overcentralize planning and decisionmaking. In
any system, this inevitably leads to various inefﬁciencies and
frustrations.
There was a period of time―I would estimate about 199799―during which I sensed a serious effort on the part of certain
Ukrainian military leaders to correct this situation. One of the more
positive outcomes of this tendency was the creation of the U.S.Ukraine “Colonels’ Conference,” a mechanism through which joint
and Service Colonel-level and below planners from each country
met regularly to set objectives and priorities and formulate proposed
schedules of events and programs. A true test of this mechanism arose
in 1998, when the Colonels’ Conference recommended signiﬁcant
modiﬁcation of a new program proposed jointly by the Ukrainian
Defense Minister and a U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. The
Colonels collectively felt that the funds involved could be better
utilized on a similar existing program rather than creating a new,
duplicative one. To the U.S. Colonels, this was considered “advice”
to be either heeded or overruled; the Ukrainian Colonels, although
in complete accord, seemed to feel the Conference was engaging in
an act of overt rebellion. I recall that Colonel General Sobkov, then
Ground Force Commander and “lead agent” for Ukraine’s military
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engagement programs, felt compelled to address the Conference
on this issue in a meeting in Kiev. He began by asking, “So I am
supposed to go to the Defense Minister and tell him I do not approve
of his idea, on the advice of this Conference?” The Ukrainian Colonels
visibly cringed. But the next thing out of the General’s mouth was,
“Well, I will. This is good advice, because I can demonstrate that what
he wants accomplished is being done by this other program. This
recommendation shows you are making excellent progress in sorting
out our priorities.” I recall to this day how completely vindicated
and energized my Ukrainian counterparts felt at this development,
and how they redoubled their efforts at our work in response. It was
as if they could spy military reform around the corner.
Despite this small victory, it eventually became clear to me that
the sad truth must nevertheless consist of one or a combination of the
following factors: (1) the General Sobkovs of Ukraine were in very
short supply; (2) they were seriously constrained in how far they
could actually go; and/or (3) they were undergoing a “counterattack”
from “reactionary forces.” I tend to believe it is a combination of the
above at work.
Based on the Colonels’ Conference’s initiatives, direct liaison via
mail, phone, e-mail, etc., between and among U.S. and Ukrainian
joint and Service counterparts began to proliferate. The relationship
between the U.S. Joint Staff and the Ukrainian General Staff began
to grow to the extent that the 3-star U.S. Joint Staff Director for
Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) was corresponding directly with his
counterpart in Kiev, and vice-versa, regarding military engagement.
Perhaps more importantly, their subordinates were exchanging email to coordinate and troubleshoot as required.
Somewhere along the line, a new entity inserted itself into this state
of affairs. The Ukrainian Department of International Cooperation
(DICMOD) was created to coordinate all military engagement
programs. This was to some extent welcomed at ﬁrst by the United
States, as it seemed logical to have a single “clearinghouse” for
administrative coordination. However, the DICMOD soon appeared
to us to be not an “administrative hub” but a new “ﬁlter” through
which we had to work. The result was a disruption in direct U.S.Ukraine military liaison on a routine basis.
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Having said all that, it has become clear to me that the power
structures in Ukraine’s military apparatus (as well as in many respects
its political apparatus overall) are purposefully fragmented so that
no one individual or agency can possibly impose his or its vision of
the way ahead. In the case of the United States, this fragmentation
is institutionalized, and there are rules for building and reaching
an overall consensus. In Ukraine, the power structure appears to be
diffuse and somewhat shifting, with no clear rules in application.
This leads (among other things) to serious frustration at the midlevel leadership in Ukraine’s military and to a deeper frustration
among Ukraine’s western military counterparts.
From a TECHNICAL point of view: Much is made, of course, of the
potential difﬁculties of cooperation between a “high tech” and “lowor mid-tech” force. To some extent, this is a concern even in regards
to U.S. cooperation with many of its NATO allies. In my opinion, this
is a greater problem in the context of a mobile, ﬂuid high-intensity
conﬂict than in a low-intensity situation such as a peacekeeping
operation. Nevertheless, the problem exists. Setting aside the
question of equipment in general, probably the greatest potential
discrepancy is in the area of information gathering, processing, and
dissemination. As U.S. forces become more capable in this area, it
becomes more critical for a coalition commander to be provided
with or to devise means to determine critical information exchange
requirements among force components and national contingents,
and make available the means to ensure that exchange takes place in
an accurate and timely manner. Ideally, this would best be enhanced
by sharing common C4ISR (command, control, communications,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) equipment and systems
across the force. For various reasons, however, this is unlikely to be
the case in a multinational coalition force. For that reason, it becomes
more important to share common technical standards across varying
equipment platforms. Sharing common fundamental understandings
of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures is an operational
element that further compensates for the aforementioned technical
disparities. Finally, a simple understanding of common practices is
generally insufﬁcient―particularly at the tactical level―without the
ability to train the forces together.

85

From a CULTURAL point of view: I have mentioned a Ukrainian
tendency to overcentralize decisionmaking. I also pointed out that
this becomes a “two-edged sword” in a sense, since even though
many routine decisions have to be made at a high level, the decision
authority at that high level itself seems to be diffused and (to me
at least) sometimes confusing. Finally, once decisions are made, the
higher authority often intervenes in or micromanages the execution of
that decision. By contrast, in the U.S. military, the doctrinal standard
is “centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.”
U.S. doctrine calls for careful identiﬁcation and understanding of the
chain of command and the locus of authority for various decisions.
This carries over into our day-to-day operations and mentality such
that we would simply feel more comfortable working directly (as
much as possible) with our counterparts on foreign planning staffs,
for example, rather than to have to be routed through a rigid ﬁlter
such as the DICMOD for even routine correspondence.
Also, since the U.S. military is an all-professional force and the
Ukrainian military still relies on conscripts, this creates certain cultural
differences. The simple fact of reduced turnover alone simpliﬁes and
enhances the ability to produce a very well collectively trained force in
an all-volunteer military. Another consideration is that when troops
are professional, they expect to be treated as professionals. This does
not entail coddling or “going easy” on people by any means. But it
does entail providing for adequate pay, shelter, and so on, as well as
elimination of petty and unnecessary practices, for example “hazing”
routines that are clearly unrelated to any meaningful training.
Of course to take maximum advantage of professionalization, we
completely revamped our training processes, both on the individual
and collective levels. In fact, we tried very hard to look at the various
factors impacting on military efﬁciency―doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities―and to make
changes simultaneously or at least in a coordinated fashion. That
remains the U.S. practice. It is very hard and does not always work
as well as it should, but it is an ideal methodology that generally
produces good results. A difference in Ukraine is that it often seems
that while reforms may be planned or attempted in one area, they
are not coordinated with the others. From my own experience, I can
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repeat that this is hard to do―even more so when a military force is
suffering from lack of funding and resources. But it must be attempted,
or at least considered so as to avoid unintended consequences in one
area as the result of change somewhere else.
While at Exercise “Peace Shield” 96 at Yavoriv Training Center
with U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili,
I had the chance to talk to a U.S. Sergeant. He told me that he had
been on the (much smaller) “Peace Shield” 95, and he had thought
the Ukrainians were “very difﬁcult to work with.” However, he
added, “They are much better this time! These boys learn fast.”
I had the privilege of escorting Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Lieutenant General Mykola Palchuk on a visit to the Pentagon and
various military facilities in the U.S. in early 1999. I recall that he
gave an absolutely superb brieﬁng on Ukraine’s National military
strategy to our Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (J-5), a threestar General. I found Palchuk to be an intelligent and engaging
ofﬁcer, with a true sense of how to proceed on many aspects of
military reform in Ukraine. Our J-5 shared my assessment, and
corresponded directly with Palchuk on a number of accessions
about aspects of reform and our military engagement program. In
the long run, however, we were disappointed. Not because Palchuk
was any less capable or well-intentioned than our estimation, but
because―it seems clear to me―of the decisionmaking environment
back in Kyiv and the lack of both resources and the political will for
comprehensive military reform.
As part of the military engagement program, the United States
provided several brieﬁngs on our system and arranged for General
Sobkov and a number of his staff to visit U.S. NCO training facilities.
We eventually crafted a program under the auspices of the U.S.
Army Sergeants’ Major Academy and the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command that largely implemented Sobkov’s vision. The
basic concept was to identify an initial cadre of Ukrainian enlisted
men through extensive competition, teach them English so they
could attend training in the United States, send them to a basic
orientation course on the U.S. military, and have them attend a U.S.
Army Basic NCO Course (BNCOC). They also attended a shortened
version of the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC). Upon graduation,
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they would join an active U.S. Army Division and be assigned to
Sergeants’ duties for 60-90 days. The ultimate goal was to create a
pool of professional Ukrainian NCOs who would eventually form
the faculty of Ukraine’s own NCO School, tentatively to be located
at the Desna Training Center. Colonel Shevtsov was designated the
Ukrainian manager for the overall effort. The United States appointed
a senior Sergeant Major to oversee its participation and to mentor
the Ukrainian NCO candidates.
After the newly-minted Sergeants returned to Ukraine and had
served for a time in Ukrainian units, the U.S. Sergeant Major and
I visited Kiev to meet with several of them in Colonel Shevtsov’s
ofﬁce. They reported that they had received excellent training and
mentoring in the United States. They also reported that they had
been well received in their new Ukrainian units. They said they had
been given considerable authority, and that their training had made
them valuable and trusted members of their units.
The U.S. Sergeant Major arranged to take the Ukrainian Sergeants
out to dinner “with no ofﬁcers around” so they would feel freer to
talk. Interestingly, the reports were very much the same in this venue
as well. However, some additional insights emerged: They were
of the opinion that in a “regular unit” vice one of the more “elite”
peacekeeping battalions, they might not feel as welcomed and wellutilized because the ofﬁcers would “not know what we are.” The
Ukrainian Sergeants felt that they (along with everyone else in the
Army) were “not very well taken care of”―primarily in the area of
housing and other care for families. Furthermore, in teaching them
English, we had provided them a rather highly marketable skill in
Ukraine, so they now had the option of leaving service to become
interpreters for much higher pay. I do not know that any of them
did, but you can see in this example an effect of not considering―
or not being able to inﬂuence―all the factors impacting on military
efﬁciency―doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities―and to make changes simultaneously
or at least in a coordinated fashion. In this case particularly, the
introduction of Sergeants probably calls for a review of leadership
education as well, for example, and an overall effort at cultural
change in the Ukrainian military. Better care for personnel (and
families) and attention to facilities (housing, medical care) may be
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required to retain NCOs with marketable skills. But again this is
hard without resources and political will for a much more ambitious
reform effort.
As long as I am reminiscing, I would like to note the contributions
of Major General Olexandr Ivashchenko of the General Staff, who
was a Colonel and my counterpart in co-chairing the Colonels’
Council, and did so much to try to make our military engagement
meaningful and useful to both countries. I recall what he said to me
in conﬁdence as he departed the airport for his ﬂight back to Ukraine:
“I was skeptical about this whole thing when I arrived here. I did not
trust you or the United States. Now I see that you want to help us. In
return you may get a potential coalition partner that you might just
need one day. Together, we can make this work.”

89

Colonel (Ukrainian Army Ret.) Dmitri Shkurko,
former Head of Media Operations at KFOR Press Information Center
There were quite a lot of incidents and provocations in Kosovo;
it was very clear there in what manner the Americans manage
similar kinds of incidents, ﬁrst of all, from a tactical point of view;
and second, from a purely informational point of view. By the way,
one must give them their due; when it comes to information, they
give signiﬁcant attention to any military operation. This is perhaps
already even a systematic approach. For example, in the case of the
ﬁring on the Kosovo village of Krivenik from Macedonian territory
(in 2001), where Albanians were killed.
First, the forces were being concentrated. Second, intelligence
efforts, including aviation reconnaissance, were being increased too.
Our helicopters did not participate because the Americans had a lot
of their own helicopters. But from a tactical point of view, it was very
clear how the powerful American machinery operates.
Our people did not take part in this particular episode, but
in similar, related actions. Joint reconnaissance was conducted
continuously. Our area of responsibility was shared with the
Americans, and we organized joint orientation groups consisting of
Ukrainians, Poles, and Americans. This was done in order to control
the region. The area under our control was right on the border with
Macedonia, and it was very unstable from the point of view of
penetration by criminal/terrorist elements, as well as from the point
of view of the transit of arms and sometimes even food. But in order
to forestall these things, raids were carried out. There were wellknown paths which they used. It was impossible to control them all
since this was in the mountains, but in the most cases we succeeded;
some of the caravans were intercepted, and Ukrainians intercepted
some. There were cases when weapons were used as well.
At the same time, one cannot say that there in Kosovo everyone
acts in accordance with American rules. Everyone acts in accordance
with common rules. And this is necessitated by the conditions
because otherwise, if during the carrying out of a tactical mission
a unit begins to think in various different ways rather than act, this
demonstrates an inability to resolve the simplest situations, and
serious situations often occur there.
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In the situation surrounding the events in Strpce, when
disturbances broke out after the killing of a Serb by Albanians after a
sniper attack on a convoy, the Americans played a positive role. But
why did they play a positive role? Because, in contrast to our troops,
they already had experience in dealing with similar situations.
When this turmoil began, our troops proved to be poorly protected
from the crowd. Flak jackets and submachine guns are not the best
equipment for use against a crowd. Moreover, the emotions of these
people were understandable, but at the same time, the fact remains―
our troops came under attack, and weapons had to be used against
the Serbs, probably for the ﬁrst time. And the Americans gave our
troops protective equipment right after the events: face shields,
protective shields, and other similar gear. This may seem elementary,
but without this equipment, it was difﬁcult to communicate with the
crowds. And after that, of course, it was not a case of mistrust, because
overall our people were controlling the situation fairly well. But there
were, for example, the mobile patrols of the Americans (they were
constantly traveling on the roads). This showed that the Americans
trusted us, but they were still monitoring our performance. In other
words, they kept the situation under control by themselves, and in
addition to this they took advantage of our abilities.
If we take daily communication, then here one can say that there
was a great deal of trust and a deﬁnite kind of cooperation, especially
at the level of interpersonal relations. Here it was a great deal simpler
than at any ofﬁcial level. They knew that we were all working on the
same team. They had no conception of, “You are a Ukrainian, you
are a Pole, you are an Austrian,” and so on. This kind of complex
often arises in NATO partner nations, which sometimes like to
demonstrate their importance, and the Americans have nothing like
this. They are ready to work on equal terms, if, of course, they see
sincere attitude towards work. If they see no sincere desire to work,
or if some kinds of “misunderstandings” begin of the type where an
ofﬁcer who comes to a brieﬁng cannot speak English, then in this
case, one cannot count on tolerance or a respectful attitude. There
were not too many cases like that, but these things did happen. It
is true that our troops learn very quickly. One must give them their
due; after one such incident, the same thing never occurred again.
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Another point is worth mentioning. I had a large number of
acquaintances among the American servicemen, and I felt very keenly
what is called the feeling of military camaraderie. The American
uniform then became my own in a way, which as an ofﬁcer with past
Soviet experience I could never even have imagined earlier, since
earlier this uniform was associated with the enemy.
In theory, if one were to assess language training, our ofﬁcers
receive satisfactory language training when they go there. Of course,
it is more complicated at the level of the soldiers, but at the level
of everyday phrases everyone knows enough to say “hello,” “goodbye,” “good luck,” and so on, and they do not need more than that.
This is because if the platoon sergeant knows English at least at the
command level, to the degree that he can understand commands,
then this is already sufﬁcient for those conditions.
Once again, we are talking not about a war, but about a
peacekeeping operation, since in this case one can accept more
ﬂexibility, but in the context of the military operation that is taking
place right now in Iraq, this level of communication is already
insufﬁcient. This is because under these war conditions, the factor
of individuality plays a role in addition to the team factor. Every
individual should be self-sufﬁcient on the battleﬁeld. This is a
Western concept, which is somewhat alien to us. In our tradition,
since the times of tank attacks and breakthroughs everything was
taken with cannon fodder, which was thrown at the embrasures
and enemy fortiﬁcations. In the West, I would say that there is a
completely different, Anglo-Saxon school of thought. According to
this school of thought, the soldier on the battleﬁeld must be selfsufﬁcient, and the greatest conﬂict between the Americans and us
with regard to cooperation is precisely the inadequate perception
of this principle―the role of the soldier on the battleﬁeld. This is
because for some of our old-fashioned, stiff generals, it is impossible
to conceive that they will sit and have lunch at the same table as an
ordinary soldier; although for the Americans, this is quite natural.
But if one accepts the principle of military comradeship, then if the
general and the soldier both equally risk their lives, there is no basis
for inequality in daily life. We can learn something from this point of
view.
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When we cooperate with the United States, we should respect
their ways of doing things. And we should expect them to respect
our views in return. But they will only respect our views in the event
that we begin to share the burden more equally, instead of constantly
expecting American support.
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Colonel (Ukrainian Army) Sergiy Poliakov,
Head of the Division of International Military Cooperation of the Western
Operational Command of the Army of Ukraine, former Ukrainian contingent
commander at KFOR
We have not done many of the things our western neighbors
have done, and they also started their new existence almost from
scratch. We acted with a false conﬁdence that was not based on
clearly formulated objectives derived from a critical reassessment of
“what we were and what we had.” But our childhood years ended,
and our more mature period had not yet begun. We continued to
wait, wondering when someone would tell us what to do and how
to do it in all areas. Somehow we expected our life to progressively
improve. Even now, with relation to the declarations on accession to
NATO, we continue attempts to make our “own” policy with other
people’s money, and money has become one of the major arguments
for participation in peacekeeping.
For 10 years, we in fact wasted the experience of our participation
in multinational operations; negligence was common at all institutional levels. We formed battalions for a 1-year mission, and after the
rotation, they were disbanded, leaving behind no impact from this
so-called experience. Every time another contingent was formed, it
began its preparation almost from scratch.
There is some interest in the military sphere in instituting ties with
NATO member states. However, it appears to be driven more by a
desire to receive than to contribute. Nothing more than a symbolic
budget is allocated to NATO cooperation, and so-called EuroAtlantic integration is for the moment little more than the training of
peacekeeping contingents. We do not fund cooperation events with
our own money, and current efforts to attain the Partnership Goals,
interoperability, and other similar aims often do not go beyond mere
declarations.
The Ukrainian generals are not very interested in and do not
strongly support the declared course of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Even if they did support it, barely any of the generals or colonels
commanding a division, brigade, or regiment can speak English.
Those few high-level military leaders (no more than a dozen)
who have already learned the language have either never been
95

commanding ofﬁcers, or have not held a command position for a
long time. Overall, language training is a unique indicator of how
words correspond to deeds.
The United States cannot continue to spend such large sums and
so much time on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as was done in the
mid-1990s. This is because American problems have become more
real―terrorism―and the partner (the Armed Forces of Ukraine) have
already made the critical decision (entry into NATO). However,
there is still an interest in supporting engagement with Ukrainians.
In the case of the deployment of Ukrainian contingents to Kosovo
and Iraq, the costs of training, supply, and insurance payments for
the Americans in case of injury or death would be much higher if the
Ukrainians were not there.
In this context, it is pertinent to recall the article of Timothy Shea
who criticized the state of American-Ukrainian military relations a
few years ago. These relations appeared to be based more on the
quantity rather than the quality of cooperative events. Ofﬁcers who
studied in U.S. military colleges and took various language courses
later left the army because there was no demand for their skills, or
they shifted to less demanding positions in the military. I know many
ofﬁcers for whom study in a college of strategic or defense studies
became a ticket to many years of administrative work in the ﬁeld
of cooperation or to long foreign assignments, and not to practical
work in and for the military. Language training had not yet reached
the level of platoons, companies and battalions.
I would characterize the current state of U.S.-Ukrainian military
relations as transitional. We need a year or a year-and-a-half to deﬁne
the direction of cooperation on the strategic level and, hopefully after
the process called “reform of the army,” its leadership will at least
be consistent, and in the best case, it will begin to work in earnest
for Euro-Atlantic integration. There are a lot of problems here that
need correction. New requirements for the education and training
of ofﬁcers will drive the reform of the entire system of education
and the organizational structure of staffs. The true implementation
of the concept of a professional NCO corps will be a blow to the
current personnel system, and the adoption of all those thousands
of STANAGs will bring with it an increase in the budget. It will be
necessary to do many other things to be able to look conﬁdently into
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the eyes of our partners of the next stage of Planning and Review
Process.
Measures at the strategic and operational levels have to be
coordinated with measures at the tactical level. Since it is already
understood what kind of decisions must be made, then instead of
waiting for decisions to be made at the top, a lot could be done at
the bottom. During their training before deploying to Iraq, the Poles
were not hesitant to invite American sergeants and captains to train
their units at the platoon level, and if one compares the actions when
on convoy escort of our platoons with the Polish ones, the results are
not to our credit.
Our chance now lies in our ability to clearly identify our own
interests. Having identiﬁed these interests, we should build our
relations with America on the basis of our own priorities, and
not think about how to better implement the plans created by the
Americans. A more adult attitude towards these issues has been
expected of us for a long time.
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Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Air Force) John Cappello,
former Operations Ofﬁcer for the Joint Contact Team Program
in Kiev, Ukraine
Overall, military-to-military cooperation has been quite positive.
U.S. Theater Security Cooperation goals and objectives are furthered
by continued engagement. There are, of course, very important
mutual beneﬁts as well. Two of the most important results of this
cooperation are increased transparency and increased familiarization
with western procedures, equipment, and doctrine. For example,
the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) provided a very important
avenue for providing familiarization on a wide range of subject
matter. The program provides familiarization on a large scope of
topics, but shallow depth. This is probably the biggest critique of the
mil-to-mil relationship: the set of security cooperation tools available
are to a certain extent passed. The relationship has progressed
beyond these tools that have been implemented in the early 1990s.
These programs include JCTP, Partnership for Peace (PfP), In Spirit
Of PfP (ISO PfP), and State Partnership Program (SPP). Not all of
these programs are applicable. They must continue to evolve as the
relationship matures and evolves. For example, the training value to
the United States is rather limited as the focus is on familiarization.
Many of these programs do not focus on the actual development of
capabilities, which, in many instances, is what the Ukrainian military
needs at this point. Enough familiarization has already transpired,
it is time to train, equip, and develop concrete capabilities. In
general, the tools that we now use do not focus on these outcomes
sufﬁciently. The program which I was involved with during my
time in Kiev was the JCTP. It provided familiarization in areas such
as: Airspace Medicine, Meteorology, Logistics Support, Patrol Boat
and Search and Rescue Ops, Demining, Civil-Military Legal Issues,
Military Police Topics, Peace Support Operations, Military Chaplains
Program, English Language Program, and Combat Communications,
just to name a few. As mentioned, these week-long familiarization
programs provided an excellent point of departure upon which we
should be building other more robust events that focus on training
and capabilities development. This is not an overly critical view of

99

the mil-to-mil relationship, the main idea in providing this critique
is to suggest that the relationship is developing and the tools we use
must develop as well. It is imperative that both sides monitor these
changes and take an active role in ensuring the proper resources are
being used to address the proper objectives.
Technical aspects of interoperability are not only serious issues
when we look at the interoperability of Ukraine and the other exWarsaw Pact nations, but are also discussions within NATO itself. It
is a very important issue that must be resolved among those that wish
to operate with one another. It is a particularly timely issue now as
coalitions continue evolve, deploy, and operate in the war on terror.
No one country can ﬁght this battle alone, and, while the United
States may bear the brunt of some deployments at the moment, all
coalition allies that volunteer to deploy forces must ﬁrst and foremost
be interoperable. As deployments against still unforeseen threats
occur, as they surely will, the interoperability question will continue
to be one that must be addressed for the success of the mission.
Basically, one of the biggest differences I have seen between
Ukrainian/Soviet standards and the western standards is in the
way we exercise and train. Scenarios are used as guidance, not to
script exact actions and maneuver. More emphasis is placed on
problem solving at the lower levels. The way we overcome this gap
is continued exposure to each other’s way of operating. Training
together provides exposure to the western standards. Educational
opportunities also expose Ukrainian leaders to the western thought
process. The International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program sends individuals to many different military education
courses in the United States. The George C. Marshall Center in
Garmisch, Germany, also provides training and education for many
east European leaders.
There are a few aspects of interoperability that we must address
when we discuss the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. There
are, of course, technical issues. These can be addressed by making
a commitment to procure interoperable systems. Foreign Military
Funding (FMF) is one program that focuses on just this. It allows the
recipient nation to purchase American equipment. Past FMF money
has been used to purchase computer equipment for the Modeling and
Simulation Center at the Ukrainian National Defense Academy. But
100

physically obtaining western equipment does not solve the problem.
Training and accepting doctrine are as, if not more, important. There
needs to be a focus on western standards. This is where there seems
to be the biggest gap. Training through IMET is one way to address
this shortcoming.
I am an optimist when looking at the future of U.S.-UKR military
cooperation. There is no doubt a lot of work to do, but my experience
is what reinforces my optimism. While serving in Kiev as the
Operations Ofﬁcer for the JCTP, I had the opportunity to work with
a large number of Ukrainian military ofﬁcers. And to a person, my
contemporaries are extremely motivated, intelligent, and capable.
But they need the tools to perform to their potential. The cultural
mindset of the Ukrainian leadership must continue to evolve
to allow for critical thinking and decentralization. Lieutenants,
Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels must be empowered to
make appropriate decisions. Education helps to provide a western
reference, but the process cannot end with the students’ graduation
from a western school, course, or training program. The individuals
must be allowed, they must be encouraged; they must be empowered
to put what they have learned into practice. Senior leadership is often
criticized for being too set in their ways, for being too inﬂexible and
unwilling to change. This is a problem that is certainly not unique
to the Ukrainian military, nor to the ex-Warsaw Pact. “Turf” wars,
parochial competition is found in many bureaucratic systems that
rely on limited resources. The U.S. military is not immune to this
type of competition. The system must be ﬂexible enough to allow for
competition and evolution. Rewards for innovation and ﬂexibility.
Critical thinking and analysis is a must. These are not traits that have
been historically valued in the Ukrainian military. Certainly resources
are necessary for the future development and modernization of
the UKR military. Limits on resources, on money, and educated
manpower severely limit the ability of leadership to implement the
reforms they state in the strategic defense review documents. But
a lack of resources does not mean that all is lost. It is imperative
that the capabilities of the younger ofﬁcers, their motivation, and
intelligence be harnessed to ﬁll the gap where able.
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Major (California Army National Guard) Joel Ostrom
Bilateral Affairs Ofﬁcer, Ofﬁce of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy,
Kiev, Ukraine
Under the Joint Contact Team Program, the major pillars
of our program are to support democracy, stability, military
professionalism, and a closer relationship with NATO. So what we
try to do is work with the Ukrainian military to develop proposals
to conduct military contacts, which support those overarching
goals. Of course, interoperability is a part of that effort because that
contributes to a closer relationship with NATO and greater readiness
for the Ukrainian military. We also want to make sure that we are
focusing on structures that will be around after the reductions.
Our whole effort is to try to help Ukraine achieve its own goals. Of
course, these are goals which are shared with the United States. Once
Ukraine declared its intention to join NATO, that certainly gave us
both a very tangible goal to work towards. And so now we are trying
to focus events that would address a particular problem and to try
and facilitate a solution. But, to be honest, from my experience, the
issues that halt us from maximizing our progress are not the types
of events that are called for or the duration or the composition of the
teams or anything like that. It is really, I think, still a matter of the
decisions that hold the whole process back.
The political leadership from Ukraine has said, “We want to go
towards NATO.” But this has not been felt throughout the armed
forces. You still have ofﬁcers who are very reluctant to move towards
that objective. I am not an expert, but is it a result of those ofﬁcers
in the system, who have not fully bought in or agree with that goal,
and perhaps they are reluctant? Or is it because they personally do
not feel that it is the right decision? Or, is it a result of the leadership
saying one thing and yet doing another?
I guess I have a couple of thoughts on the prospects for U.S.Ukraine military interoperability. One is about the capabilities
which rest here already, and then the categorization or the difference
between peacekeeping operations and combat operations and the
forces, which are brought to bear on those two areas. I think, ﬁrst
of all, there is a difference between the United States and Ukraine
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in how we perceive, and therefore prepare, forces for peacekeeping
operations as opposed to combat operations. In the United States, we
train soldiers for their combat mission. So our units are structured for
combat, they are trained for combat operations―to ﬁght and win the
nation’s wars. That is our mission. Now, if there is a peacekeeping
mission, we still use those same forces which are trained for combat.
The difference is that those forces are tailored, in other words, we
may (from this brigade or another division) extract parts, take away
pieces, and then add pieces to it to make a unique structure, which
is appropriate to the situation. For instance, in a peacekeeping
situation, perhaps we would add more military police, we would
add more security forces. Perhaps we would take away artillery.
We are very used to that, because in combat operations, we do the
same thing. We may add more infantry troops; or armor based on
METT-T―based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and the time
available. So that is kind of how I think the U.S. military approaches
peacekeeping operations. And, of course, there is additional training
that they receive to ensure that they know the rules on the use of
force, for instance, and to ensure that they understand the situation
that they are going into and that they understand the other coalition
forces which are participating. But it is my impression, and I may be
misinformed, that Ukraine has this idea that we train speciﬁc forces
speciﬁcally for peacekeeping and for those types of missions, and
therefore those units would not be used, necessarily, in a combat
situation, but would reserved speciﬁcally for a peacekeeping mission.
So I think there is a difference there. The United States always trains
for the highest global conﬂict, and the theory is that, if you can go
to combat, go to war, then you have all the skills required of you in
any kind of given situation, in a peacekeeping situation. Because, of
course, if something went wrong . . .
Since you cannot deploy draftees immediately, Ukraine creates
new units speciﬁcally for peacekeeping missions, but I think that is a
very big challenge. And a new unit, at least in our experience, is not
combat effective until they have trained for a considerable amount of
time, until they learn the processes and develop their own sustained
operational procedures.
I think that is a challenge of the transition from a contract to a
professional army. If you have a professional army, then the army
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purposefully changes, molds, and adapts itself to the requirements
of the mission. So, if our mission is to have ready and trained forces
available for worldwide deployment, then our soldiers who are
trained to provide that capability must be mobile, they must be able
to be reassigned and ready to work within a new unit, both during
combat, as well as peacetime.
I also think it is important for us to develop more of our military
language capabilities. We have looked at many ways to achieve
that―through contractors, or some kind of machine where you type
it in, and it translates―but I think our experience in contingency
operations shows that we need a soldier on the ground who
understands military operations as well as the language.
The Ukrainian military are making efforts to achieve that goal. Of
course, there is always room for improvement. But, establishing rules
which tie that goal to individual advancement rather than simply
saying “our goal is to achieve X percentage,” I think is where you
will ﬁnd success and progress. Everyone is interested in advancing
and growing to that next rank. So if you say, “Look. If you are going
to be a major, you have to speak at least one NATO language at a
certain level. Or if you are going to be a senior NCO, you have to
have this capability.” . . . Well, it seems as though there is a core
group of people, and some of them have studied here in Ukraine
through a foreign language school or through their own efforts. And
as a result of that, when it came time to send someone to the West
for school, leaders looked for someone who had some educational
basis for learning in English. Those were the soldiers who were
chosen to go, and then, of course, once they went to the school, their
English dramatically improved, and they truly became the subjectmatter experts and people who were marked: “You are an English
speaker, so you will coordinate activities with NATO, you will be the
interpreter, you will do all these things.” But the problem is that that
base is not very broad, especially in units that will be deployed. Here
in Kiev, it seems that there are sufﬁcient numbers of people who
speak English to coordinate with, but when you go to a contingency
operation, we are severely lacking.
In terms of interoperability of various areas, like staff procedures
and ammunition or the difference between using a Kalashnikov and
an M-16, I do not think we could say that those are not important,
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but I think it is a matter of priorities. We can operate using two
different sources of ammunition. We can have supplies coming from
two different locations, merging to that same operational point.
But the other issues, which are very important, which you cannot
necessarily do without, are things like command and control. You
have to know and have a mutual understanding of command and
control to be an effective force. And that is true in every military
organization. So when you bring it together to be one organization,
you have to operate within those same understandings. And I think
that is sometimes difﬁcult, but that will come along. But there are
cultural differences that are reﬂected in a different approach to our
command and control. For example, in the U.S. system, we place high
importance on delegating decisionmaking authority to the lowest
level that can possibly make that decision. So our junior NCOs, when
they are out there, are making decisions on the spot. And there is
no fear for them to make that decision, because the institution itself
not only encourages them to make decisions but demands that they
make those decisions. Now the evaluation of that person is not a
matter of whether they made that decision or not, it is a matter of
how well they made that decision. Here in Ukraine, our experience
has been much different. The decisionmaking authority does not
really come until you reach the grade of colonel. That does not mean
that people are not working―junior people are working, but they are
generally working preparing documents to be submitted to a higher
level, the decision is made by the colonel or general, and the decision
is transmitted back down the chain of command. This is a cultural
difference, but it is difﬁcult. For instance, in the headquarters, you
may have a junior enlisted soldier in the U.S. military sitting side
by side with a Ukrainian major or a captain and essentially doing
the same work. That is a cultural difference, but it is a difference
which hampers interoperability. In the Ukrainian military, you have
technical experts who are senior in grade, and technical experts in our
military are junior in grade (junior NCOs or enlisted soldiers). And
whether it is the operator of a piece of machinery or communications
gear, the rank difference makes it very difﬁcult.
Routine staff decisions as well are elevated all the way up to the
Minister of Defense himself, or the Chief of the General Staff; things
that, as a major on the U.S. side, I typically make. I am charged to
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work with the Ukrainian military, to meet them, and develop a
program of events. So we get together at a conference, both Ukrainian
military representatives as well as U.S., and we collectively decide
what events we think we would like to conduct for the next year. Of
course in the process of doing that, we use the guidance from our
leadership such as a focus on Rapid Reaction Force or military interoperability, closer relationship with NATO, stability, democracy . . .
All those kinds of things.
We have the political guidance; the United States wants to
have a cooperative relationship, a beneﬁcial relationship with
Ukraine. We actively seek Ukraine’s participation in the Western
community of nations. Those are the kinds of high political goals,
which are developed by the President, the National Security Strategy.
The ambassador ampliﬁes that locally. And, of course, our higher
military headquarters looks at that as well, and then U.S. European
Command takes that political guidance and distills it down to
military goals and objectives, and then it comes down to us. And
now it is our job to take those goals and objectives and then develop
a program which supports all of that. But getting back to this point
about decisionmaking authority, once this program is developed,
we, of course, submit it for approval and funding. So it comes back
approved. At that point, our leadership says, “Okay, execute.”
Essentially it gives us the mission, they say, conduct these events. So
what I do at that point is, I turn these events into a schedule, and we
assign those dates, and we go about executing it. Now if there is a
date change or a schedule change, I approve that at my level. On the
Ukrainian side, it still requires an ofﬁcial letter be sent, despite the
fact that they have already approved the event set. So that is a very
tangible sign, really, that we have different staff procedures, and
that we have differences in the way that we delegate authority. And
as we move and help Ukraine come closer to NATO, those kinds of
things, I think, have to change, because NATO just does not work
that way. You have to be more ﬂexible, you have to be faster, and
you have to be more efﬁcient.
And we can look to businesses as an example, businesses would
never tolerate such bureaucracy, because it takes too much time
for senior people to review, to make all those decisions. Senior
leaders have to preserve their time and apply it to more important
decisions.
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Well, the biggest success story of course, is the brigade-plus that is
deployed to Iraq. Despite the fact that it is not a good thing that we had
to deploy to Iraq, but it does also provide many opportunities, both to
demonstrate our capabilities to work together currently, to learn from
those, conducting honest after-action reports, looking objectively at
how we are deploying, how we are operating, how we conduct all the
various actions that we take. And then working to solve those kinds
of challenges. So there are a lot of opportunities, assets that Ukraine
has, of course, starting with Ukrainian cargo capabilities. Ukraine has
a huge airlift potential to contribute towards operations, regardless
of whether it is peacekeeping, combat, or whatever. So there are a lot
of assets that Ukraine is able to contribute to NATO as well as other
organizations’ efforts. It seems to me that the opportunities to work
together are really unlimited. I mean, you can look at every aspect
of operations and say, “As long as you have a trained force, there is
opportunity to work together.” But the challenges that are associated
with those opportunities are those which we have already identiﬁed,
and that is, primarily, interoperability. Interoperability in technical,
interoperability in the ammunition that we use, the vehicles, the
fuel that we use, as well as procedurally, the command and control
systems that we talk about, staff procedures, the way that we conduct
mission analysis, the military decisionmaking process, etc. Those all
beneﬁt from NATO standards, and at every level, not just a couple
of units, not just a couple of people who speak English, but all units
have to adopt this method that NATO uses, so that regardless of
what emergency comes up, that Ukraine will also have the ability
to task organize and to tailor its forces they are going to contribute.
And that force, however it is created or built, will already have those
capabilities inherent in the people that make up that unit, and they
will already be interoperable by their training. And then it is just a
matter of working internally to make that task-organized unit work
together as a cohesive unit. And then when it deploys alongside
coalition forces, NATO forces, they will be able to essentially plugand-play.
The most glaring difference is evident when we try to work
directly together, to simply coordinate events which have already
been approved. I cannot just call and say, “I’d like to come over for
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half an hour or an hour. Can you meet today?” Even though we
may have a good relationship, he is obliged to say, “No, I’m sorry,
you have to write a letter requesting this meeting.” And then he has
to submit it to his chain of command to get a decision, and it has to
come back down. And then, even if it is approved, we cannot meet at
his ofﬁce. There are only designated places where we can meet. I can
meet him at the ofﬁcers’ club, I can meet him at the NATO Liaison
Ofﬁce, I can meet him at the Multinational Staff Ofﬁcers’ Course. But
that rule assumes that we are not partners, it assumes that we are
not working together. If we assume that we are going to work as a
NATO ally, to come closer, then staff ofﬁcers should have the ability
to really work together.
The impression left is that either they do not trust the person that
is asking for this meeting, that they feel that there is some information
that they have to protect. So now my parents, the U.S. Army, have
said, “Go talk to the Ukrainians. Work with them. Help them become
closer with NATO. Help with stability. Help with democracy. Help
with military professionalism. Help with interoperability.” So I am
here, my door is open, I am happy to work with anyone who comes
by. But, on the other hand, my good neighbor still has to go ask his
mother for the opportunity to talk to me.
I am fearful that we will waste these opportunities. The Joint
Contact Team Program (JCTP), for instance, that has a robust
program has been providing information to Ukraine for about 5
years now, providing both familiarization visits, bringing Ukrainians
to Western Europe or the United States, showing them any kind
of subject material or organization. We also bring U.S. experts to
Ukraine to provide brieﬁngs on a variety of topics to Ukrainians. But
this program will not last forever. We have already been told that the
JCTP will decline―nothing lasts forever; we need to make sure that
reform happens concurrently with these programs. If we wait and
reform does not occur until later, this program will not be around
when it is needed. Only then will people want to implement change,
when they need the information. We are providing the information
now, but if the bureaucracy is not willing to implement it, then it is
wasted. And the worst part is, when you need the information later,
when the bureaucracy is willing to accept it, the funding will no
longer be there, and it will be even harder to convince our Congress
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to provide the money. The response will be, “We already did that,
and we did it for 5 years already. Why should we fund this again?”
But that is the moment of truth, when Ukraine is actually ready to
make reform a reality. I just hope we still have the money to help
make reform possible. We are working hard, but to maximize the
effort Ukraine needs to take full advantage of the opportunities that
are available now.
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Colonel (U.S. Army) Timothy Shea,
Some Thoughts on U.S.-Ukraine Interoperability
Common Interests and Background for Cooperation.
As part of the 3D Infantry Division (3ID) staff, I was assigned as
the project ofﬁcer for designing the ﬁrst “Peace Shield” exercise with
Ukraine in 1994-95. We had just executed “Peacekeeper 94” with
the Russians in October 1994, when we were tasked to meet with
MOD in Kyiv to plan a peacekeeping exercise with the Ukrainian
MOD. Cooperation was excellent, and both sides were enthusiastic.
3ID was autonomous and self-sufﬁcient in planning with little help
or interference from higher headquarters (I was a Eurasian Foreign
Area Ofﬁcer with planning/exercise design experience―the division
maintained this billet and expertise for years). Brigadier General
David Grange, Assistant Division Commander, led most planning
events. On the U.S. side, the Commanding General took personal
interest in all activities.
When I arrived in Ukraine as the Army Attaché in 1998, I was
surprised to see that the “Peace Shield” exercise had not evolved
much from the initial event. Division of labor was such that the
Ukrainian side focused on welcome ceremony/reception and
portions of the ﬁeld exercise. Staff interaction was minimal. On both
sides the event became routine, with less senior leader involvement,
especially on the Ukrainian side. Major General Grange, now the
Division Commander, retained a personal interest, but operational
matters took away opportunities to focus. Increasingly fragmented
portions of U.S. units were used as participants in later exercises
such as the California National Guard, Illinois National Guard, and
SETAF. It became harder to understand who was in charge, and I
found it necessary as the Army Attaché to take an increasingly active
role. Problems dealing with the Western Operational Command also
moved the focus of exercises away from interoperability and toward
a “Pokazukha” circus-like show for Ukrainian Minister of Defense.
Computer exercises were increasingly organized by U.S.-sponsored
contractors. Interoperability became secondary to other concerns
such as funding issues, U.S. operational distractions in the Balkans,
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introduction of new units, organizations, and leaders unfamiliar
with Ukraine. I felt things were going backwards and set out to make
improvements with “Peace Shield 2000.” Ground Forces Command
(Ukraine) was not interested in integrating the Ukrainian-Polish
Peacekeeping Battalion into “Peace Shield,” even though the two
parts of the unit were almost colocated near Yavoriv Training Area.
Breaking the Mold. Although I was unsuccessful in getting an
“airborne” exercise approved, I convinced both EUCOM and Colonel
Yakubets (Chief of Airborne, Ground Forces) to conduct an airborne
exercise inside “Peace Shield 2000.” This event was the best example I
have seen demonstrating U.S.-Ukraine interoperability. The U.S. 82d
Airborne Division and Ukrainian Airmobile forces were enthusiastic
planners as were their air force counterparts. Discussions on drop
zone assembly procedures and aerial link up considerations over
Poland were very impressive and substantially different from the
typically tired approach used for the stagnating “Peace Shield”
series exercises of late 1990s. Unfortunately, for unknown reasons,
this type of exercise was discontinued.
In the fall of 1999, I assisted the Ukrainian General Staff in
deploying to the Balkans as part of KFOR. There were several legal
and administrative problems in stafﬁng a Memorandum with U.S.
Army Europe for Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement for
goods and services, and with the Transfer of Authority (TOA) placing
Ukrainian forces within the NATO/U.S. chain of command. For
weeks the whereabouts of TOA was unknown, resulting in Ukrainian
forces being denied permission to conduct PKO. Later I organized
a leader’s recon to Camp Bondsteel to support the deployment of
the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion―it was evident that coordination
and interoperability inside the Ministry of Defense between Ground
Forces Command and the General Staff was deplorable, resulting in
miscommunications and poor coordination of activities.
In the summer of 2000 as I was reassigned from Ukraine to
the Joint Staff, I noted that tactical-operational cooperation was
generally outstanding, but the United States and Ukraine were miles
apart at senior levels (General Ofﬁcer). The Joint Staff and Ukrainian
General Staff conducted POTOMAC DNIPRO in May 2002, which
was considered the ﬁrst step in achieving military interoperability at
the strategic level. The game players discussed and examined each
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side’s capabilities for combined response to crisis situations, such as
a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and possible long-term
missions for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions.
Each delegation was led by a General Ofﬁcer, with functional staff
representatives on each side for operations, planning, logistics,
intelligence, communications, and legal counsel. The Ukrainian
Military representative from the United Nations and the Political
Ofﬁcer from the U.S. Embassy Kyiv were players, as well as Defense
Attaches from both countries. Game players made signiﬁcant
progress in understanding each other’s decisionmaking processes
and command structures. The process of planning and designing
the game provided greater understanding of Joint Staff and General
Staff coordination procedures. The Ukrainian side considered this
game to be instrumental in facilitating the Ukrainian deployment in
support of Iraqi Freedom.
Current Progress.
A follow-on POTOMAC DNIPRO wargame was conducted in
the Fall 2004 to capitalize on lessons learned in Iraq and to build on
interoperability. Use of Marshall Center courses and IMET slots are
improving but still need attention.
The exercise regime of “Peace Shield” and “Sea Breeze” continue,
but seem to have little more than symbolic value. The U.S. side uses
the National Guard, and the Ukrainians recently used cadets instead
of actual soldiers. There is still no tie in with Mission Rehearsal
Exercises (MRE) for Ukrainian units deploying to Iraq for next
rotation.
Soviet-era structure DICMOD is alive and well. An unnecessary
bureaucracy that over centralizes interaction, discourages direct
contact, steals IMET/Marshall Center slots, and is an obstacle to
genuine interoperability.
Challenges of Cooperation and Lessons Learned.
• A casual and complacent attitude regarding exercises at
Yavoriv Training Area has become entrenched. Other locations
and units should be considered.
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• Ukrainian units deploying abroad are provisional and break
up upon return. This loss of unit integrity and experience is
a tremendous waste. Ukraine must colocate families that are
part of these units so that the ofﬁcers and soldiers continue to
serve in high ready units (Rapid Reaction Forces).
• Exercises should focus on actual units (U.S. and Ukraine) that
will deploy out of country. Using third tier units and cadets
from Western Operational Command and U.S. National
Guard units contributes little to real interoperability.
• War games and combined staff events provide real
opportunities to develop interoperability at the strategicoperational levels.
• Too much of “interoperability” and security cooperation is
based on personalities that are passionate about initiating
new events (very small density). Responsibility on both sides
needs to be broadened so that a larger pool of ofﬁcers is
able to initiate new ideas and understand counterparts. The
Ukrainian side has an extremely small density of operational
ofﬁcers capable of pursuing interoperability issues.
• NCO Corps. Until the ofﬁcer corps understands how to use
NCOs effectively (without feeling threatened), it is useless to
expend resources on developing such a capability.
• National Academy of Defense―U.S. institutional partnership.
Perhaps exchanging professors with George C. Marshall
Center (or other institution) might permit some much needed
changes to curriculm/topics in Ukraine. A Ukrainian colonel
assigned to Garmisch for a year, to teach afterwards at the
National Academy of Defense, would help interoperability.
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